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Abstract

With the rapid technological advancements of sensors, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become the main technology for the Internet of Things (IoT). We investigated the security of WSNs in
an environmental monitoring system with the goal to improve the overall security. We implemented
a Secure Temperature Monitoring System (STMS), which served as our investigational environment.
Our results revealed a security flaw found in the bootstrap loader (BSL) password used to protect
firmware in the MSP430 MCU. We demonstrated how the BSL password could be brute forced in a
matter of days. Furthermore, we illustrate how an attacker can reverse engineer firmware and obtain
copies of cryptographic keys. We contributed a solution to improve the BSL password and better
protect firmware found in the MSP430 chips. The Secure-BSL software we contributed allows the
randomization of the BSL password. Our solution increases the brute force time to decades. The
impractical brute force time improves the security of firmware and prevents future reverse engineering tactics. In addition, our Secure-BSL software supports two-factor authentication that allows
developers to specify a user-defined passphrase to further protect the MSP430 MCU. Our research
serves as proof that any security implemented in a WSN environment is broken if an attacker has
access to firmware found in sensor devices.

xi

Chapter 1
Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) has become a popular subject in the industry and will soon reach the
popularity level of smartphones. With the rapid technological advancements of sensors, Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become the main technology for IoT [5]. WSNs are composed of a
large number of sensors that are physically small, communicate wirelessly among each other, and are
deployed without prior knowledge of the network topology [1]. The deployment environments could
be over small or large geographical areas in locations that are either public or hostile. Typically, the
environments require little human interaction and go unattended for months or even years. The three
key characteristics of sensor networks are to continuously monitor surroundings, trigger any alerts
based on circumstances occurring, and provision of information on demand [2]. Sensor applications
can be broken down into two categories: tracking or monitoring. Tracking examples include the
tracking of enemies in a military environment or tracking inventory in a commercial environment
[3]. Monitoring examples include monitoring room temperatures in a building or home monitoring
used in burglar alarm systems.
The main difference between WSNs and wireless networks is the characteristics of the devices
that are part of the network. In wireless networks, most of the connected devices are computers,
laptops, tablets, or smart phones. In a WSN, the connected devices are solely sensors that use
a machine-to-machine paradigm. Unlike the devices found in a wireless network, sensor devices
are very limited in processing power, battery life, communication bandwidth, and memory [4]. In
particular, battery energy is the main resource to conserve in a WSN because of the domino effect–
it has on other resources. For example, if the battery power decreases then the computational
power and communication bandwidth decreases with an overall effect on the sensor. With that
being said, current protocols used in wireless networks are meant for devices that support expensive
computations and not suitable for sensor devices. WSN research has shown a significant shift to
proposing new protocols and algorithms that take into consideration the limited battery life and
computation power of sensor devices. A popular research topic has been the security of a WSN
environment.
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According to Gartner, there will be nearly 26 billion IoT devices by 2020 [5]. As we witness
more IoT devices connecting to the Internet, the overall security of systems is more vulnerable. As
discussed by OFlaherty, sensor devices will become the favored point of entry for compromising
other, bigger targets [5]. Even worst, botnets will find millions of new ”recruits” in the form of
zombie appliances or ”sensor devices” [6]. Securing WSNs at an early stage will be a critical role in
protecting the future of the Internet. Using todays cryptographic protocols, such as RSA and AES,
raises two problems in a WSN environment. The first problem is the fact that these protocols are
computationally expensive. The second problem is the fact that these protocols do not protect the
nature of sensor devices going unattended for years. A shift in looking at security with different
points of view has been seen in WSNs research.
Encryption and authentication are vital components in WSNs. In the past, many researchers
have proposed efficient cipher protocols with one goal in mind: to reduce computational power
[7][8][9][4][10][11][12][1][13][14][15][16][17][18].

Although Skipjack has been a popular cipher for

WSNs, latest research has shifted towards using hardware implementation encryption. The Secure Temperature Monitoring System (STMS) that we have implemented makes use of the AES
inline encryption built in to the CC2420 Radio Frequency chips. The STMS is used as our WSN
experimental environment to evaluate the overall security of WSNs. In Chapter 3, we discuss the
design, the implementation, as well as the test results for our STMS.
Other than efficient ciphers research, there has also been numerous proposals in implementing
Public Key Cryptography on WSNs. Using RSA as a key management crypto system for WSNs
is possible, however, not practical when it comes to saving battery life on constraint sensor devices. Research has shown a shift towards using ECC as the default key management protocol for
implementing PKC in WSNs [19][20][21][22]. Experimental results show that implementing PKC
on WSNs is possible and more importantly maintains low computational power requirements. In
Chapter 2.3, we highlight survey results of various key management protocols and algorithms proposed for WSNs. Our goal is to provide background information on key management protocols
and demonstrate how we have broken all these protocols. In Chapter 5, we demonstrate how we
reverse engineered firmware found in one of our STMS nodes and were able to obtain a copy of the
cryptographic key used in our secure WSN environment.
Similar to the key management protocols proposed, preventing node capture attacks has been
a popular research topic for WSNs. Node capture attacks is a well respected research field within
WSN due to the fact that sensor devices are deployed in unattended environments with easy physical
access. Unlike computers or servers that are either physically locked or encrypted, sensor devices lack

3

these features. In Chapter 2.4, we highlight various algorithms and schemes proposed to mitigate
information leakage from physically capturing nodes. All of the proposed schemes have one thing in
common: they all assume that a node has been captured but do not highlight the consequence of
capturing a node. The most popular schemes make the assumption that N number of nodes must
be compromised before breaking the security of the entire WSN [23][24][25].
Not a lot of research has been done in evaluating node tampering methodologies to extract
firmware found in sensor nodes. Most of the research out there has overlooked the consequences of
tampering captured nodes. The physical security of sensor nodes is a vital component of the overall
security of WSNs. For instance, recent research has shown that the MSP430 MCU family chips
are vulnerable to brute force attacks. The bootstrap loader passwords used to protect unwanted
access to the micro-controller is weak. The actual password is stored at the same address location
as the Interrupt Vector Table (IVT) for the MSP430 chips [26]. Storing the IVT and the password
at the same address location suggests that the password is identical to the IVT. Using the IVT as
the password makes the physical security of MSP430 chips weak and research has shown that the
256-bit password can be lowered to a 40-bit password [27]. However, brute forcing a 40-bit key space
in the best case scenario is impractical because it would take 32 years [28].
In this thesis, we reduced the brute force time from years to a matter of days. Instead of
reducing bits of a passwords, we used a different approach of using a password prediction technique.
In Chapter 4, we highlight our approach of analyzing password samples and presenting the password
patterns found between applications. In Chapter 6, we discuss our contributions of implementing
the Secure-BSL software to improve the password used to protect access to the MSP430 through
randomization. Our results and evaluations of our improved Secure-BSL password generator are
highlighted in Chapter 7. We hope that this thesis can serve as motivation for further research in
the physical security of sensors.

4

Chapter 2
Related Work

In this chapter, we provide related work to support different components of our thesis as well as
highlight the overall history of WSNs research. We highlight various sensor applications and provide
examples of related temperature monitoring systems. We discuss in detail the two security problems
with WSNs that have been popular topics of research. In addition, we present various research in
protecting WSNs from node capture attacks. Lastly, we end our chapter with a discussion on the
not so popular topic of node tampering attacks.

2.1

Applications

There are numerous WSN applications, but ultimately they all fall into two categories: monitoring
and tracking. Monitoring examples include temperature levels, humidity levels, ultra-violet levels,
pressure levels, noise levels, etc. Tracking examples include movements of objects, directions of
objects, traveling speeds, absence or presence of objects. Furthermore, applications vary depending
on the environment where the sensors are deployed. A WSN can be deployed in the following
environments: military, environmental, health, public and personal. In a military environment
sensors can be an integral component for battlefield surveillance or reconnaissance of opposing forces
and terrain [3]. In environmental applications sensors can play a critical role for example in detecting
forest fires [29] or monitoring micro climates in crop fields [30]. In a health environment sensors can
be used for example to monitor patients’ health by implanting a cubic-millimeter computer into a
patient’s body [31]. In a commercial environment sensors can used for example to detect car thefts
[32] or management of inventory tracking [33]. In a personal environment sensors can be integrated
on every day appliances [34] and ultimately create a smart home environment [35]. It is up to our
imagination on where WSNs can be integrated.
Most of the applications, including the former examples, are deployed in environments that are
resource expensive to simulate. Our research concentrates in the physical security of sensor devices
and not the actual sensor applications. For example, simulating a Wildfire Monitoring System [36]
requires the purchase of expensive equipment that is unnecessary for our research purpose. We
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instead concentrate in researching sensor applications that are inexpensive to simulate so we don’t
have to buy expensive hardware. These inexpensive systems have similar security concerns as the
more complex systems. Without a loss of generality, we chose a temperature monitoring system
application of sensor networks for this research. In fact, we found that temperature monitoring
systems using WSN is a popular field of research.
The researchers at Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology (SIIT) implemented a remote
temperature monitoring system that collected classroom temperature levels and provided necessary
data for the energy consumption management of air conditioning units [38]. The SIIT implementation made use of the Zigbee protocol to implement their network, consisting of a Coordinator,
End-Devices and a web server for a GUI. A similar system was implemented at Berkley to monitor
room temperatures using the Coordinator and End-Devices approach [39]. The difference between
the two is the implementation software used; SIIT used XBee, where as Berkley used Code::Blocks
software. Another temperature monitoring system was implemented using MATLAB software, which
also made use of the Zigbee protocol [40]. All three systems suggest that building on top of the
Zigbee protocol is a popular choice. The Zigbee protocol serves at the network layer and is built
on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. Besides Zigbee, another commonality found between the
monitoring systems is the use of unencrypted and unauthenticated communications. Although the
Zigbee protocol provides security services, to our knowledge there is no open source implementation
of the security features. Furthermore, there is a limited Zigbee open source code available but most
Zigbee software is proprietary [41]. Keep in mind that Zigbee is built on top of the IEEE 802.15.4
layer; therefore, if the physical layer is broken then all upper layers, including Zigbee, are no longer
secure. We give details about the physical security of motes in Section 2.5. Please note that our
temperature monitoring system builds on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 layer.

2.2

Cipher Protocols

One of the main problems with securing WSNs is the limited resources supported by the sensor
devices. In particular, resources such as battery power, computational power and memory size
are limited. Almost all sensor devices are deployed in open environments and will go unattended
for months or even years. Therefore, common encryption systems used by computers or smart
phones are not practical for sensor devices. A lot of research has been devoted into proposing cipher
protocols that use less computational power, thus increasing the battery lifetime of sensor devices.
We highlight popular ciphers that have been proposed for WSNs with the goal to provide information
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why we chose the in-line AES cipher for our WSN environment.
Previous research has shown a connection between ciphers and the type of micro-controller used.
For example, the MD5, SHA-1, IDEA, RC4, and RC5 ciphers were evaluated using 8-bit, 16-bit,
and 32-bit micro-controllers. The results showed that 32-bit micro-controllers out performed 8-bit
and 16-bit roughly by a factor of two because of the 64-bit block sizes used in these ciphers [4].
On the other hand, 8-bit micro-controllers out perform 32-bit micro-controllers when evaluating the
performance of stream ciphers such as LEX [9]. The type of micro-controller and security policies
play an important role in selecting the appropriate cipher. Law et al. [1] provides a good verdict
of how to choose a suitable cipher and recommends Skipjack as the best cipher choice for WSN.
Using a MSP430 emulator, experimental results showed that Skipjack is the most energy efficient
compared to RC5, RC6, Rijndael, Twofish, MISTY1, KASUMI, and Camellia [1].
In fact, TinySec uses Skipjack to provide the first fully-implemented link layer security supporting
two modes of operation: encryption only (CBC) or encryption and authentication (CBC-MAC) [11].
The research presented by Karlof et al. has been one of the most respected and many researchers
have proposed improved versions of TinySec. For example, MiniSec was proposed as an improvement
to reduce power consumption of TinySec by using OCB cipher modes to encrypt and authenticate
simultaneously [14]. As another example, FlexiSec was proposed to improve the security of TinySec
by implementing Bloom-filters to prevent replay attacks [10]. Other protocols, such as the LLSP,
have been proposed as a link layer security; however, they’re just replicas of TinySec with a few
modifications [13]. Besides Skipjack, another cipher family that has been a respected choice for
WSNs is the RC4 and RC5 ciphers. The first ever WSN security proposal was the SPINS protocol,
which used the RC5 cipher to implement encryption and broadcast authentication [15]. Recent
research has shown a shift towards stream ciphers by improving the key generation process of RC4
[12]. All of the proposed ciphers are software implementations that did not take into consideration
the efficiency of using hardware implementation.
Although AES is one of the most computational expensive ciphers, it has still been used in at least
three research proposals [16] [42] [17]. However, all three proposals made use of the AES software
implementation. The micro-controller used in [16] and [42] was the MSP430. The CC2420 RF chips
have an inline AES-128 hardware implementation that supports three different modes of operation:
encryption only (CTR), authentication only (CBC-MAC) or encryption and authentication (CCM)
[43]. Running the hardware implementation version of AES on the CC2420 is significantly more
efficient than running the software implementation version of AES on the MSP430. Andersen and
Tranberg prove that the CC2420 radio inline CCM security mechanism is 42 times faster and uses
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4.5 times less energy than the similar software implementation running on the MSP430 MCU [7].
Furthermore, Buesching and Wolf demonstrated that the throughput of the AES-128 CBC mode
implementations to be 1,085kb/s for hardware version and 28kb/s for software version [8]. Tranberg
[18] evaluated that the CC2420 security features out perform the TinySec and MiniSec protocols
both in security level and efficiency. We make use of the CC2420 inline security feature because of
the reasons presented, as well as the fact that we used TelosB motes with our WSN environment.

2.3

Key Management Protocols

In todays Internet, RSA is the most commonly used crypto system to manage the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The computational overhead of RSA is significant and unreasonable to implement
in WSNs. Lots of research has been done to find algorithms that significantly reduce the resource
overhead for key management technologies. We highlight popular key management algorithms that
have been proposed and show the major security flaws found on each, when a sensor device has been
physically captured.
One of the first key management algorithms was proposed by Jolly et al. Their key management
approach pre-deploys a shared symmetric key used for future key exchange and key renewal secure
communication [44]. The major security flaw found with the algorithm proposed by Jolly is not
knowing when the shared symmetric key has been compromised. An attacker can impersonate the
central node by obtaining a copy of the share symmetric key through reverse engineering techniques.
Watro el at. proposed TinyPK which makes use of RSA to prevent impersonation attacks [45].
TinyPK is inefficient and does not handle the problem of revoking compromised private keys. A
compromised sensor node can be used to maliciously authenticate to the WSN by obtaining a copy
of the private keys. The following two examples were proposed back in 2003 when WSNs were first
introduced.
Between 2006 and 2015, there was a shift towards using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
to implement PKI in WSNs. For example, one of the first proposed technologies that made use of
ECC was NanoECC. NanoECC was implemented using TinyOS and evaluated on the Mica2 and
TelosB sensor nodes. The evaluation results showed that the energy consumption to compute point
multiplication in the MSP430-F1611 MCU was 7.95mJ [19]. Although NanoECC is more efficient
than TinyPK, the security flaw of not revoking compromised private keys remained in the NanoECC.
The researchers at Harvard University also implemented ECC for PKI in WSNs. Their EccM 2.0
PKI software is open source for future research purposes [20]. The EccM 2.0 was tested using Mica2
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motes, and compared to NanoEcc , the EccM 2.0 results show higher energy consumptions because
bigger key sizes were evaluated. Even if the key size improved security in the EccM 2.0, it is still
vulnerable to node capture attacks. The foundation of most key management research has been
TinyECC, which also uses ECC for PKI in WSNs. Compared to NanoECC [19] and EccM 2.0 [20],
TinyECC’s main feature is the flexibility to configure ECC to best fit specific application needs [21].
Similar to the previous two technologies, TinyECC suffers from node capture attacks. Researchers
at William and Mary proposed their own ECC implementation which still suffers from the same
problem of not securing the private keys [22].
Other proposed algorithms suffer from the same security flaw of not protecting the private keys
from being compromised. For example, Nilsoon and Roosta proposed a key management scheme that
uses three pre-installed keys: one authentication key, one encryption key and one network key [46].
Du et al. also proposed a scheme that pre-loads a secret key for future key exchange communication
[47]. Similarly, Alfandi et al. proposed that each sensor node on a WSN has a certificate signed by a
Certificate Authority [48]. Mansour et al. attempted to improve the security of the private keys by
using a pre-shared key to renew the private keys [42]. All three proposals suffer from node capture
attacks where the private keys can be compromised. Zhang et al. highlighted various pre-deployment
schemes, which all suffer from node capture attacks [49]. All of the highlighted technologies have
one thing in common: they all do not consider the consequences of capturing a sensor node, reverse
engineering data found in memory, and obtaining secret information such as private keys. Without
keeping the private keys a secret, all of these proposed solutions are broken.

2.4

Node Capture

Unlike the technologies discussed in Section 2.3, there has been other research proposals that handle
cases when a sensor node has been captured. The technologies proposed can be divided into four
categories. The first category is key distribution technologies that require large number of nodes
to be captured in order to gain any significant results. The second category is key revocation
technologies that prevent the compromise of future encrypted information. The third category is
intrusion detection systems (IDS) that detect capture nodes in a WSN. The fourth category is
intrusion prevention systems (IPS) that prevent the disclosure of sensitive WSN information.
The first category is key distribution technologies that require the capture of large number of
nodes to attain any significant gain. Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a pair-wise pre-distribution
of keys to allow private sharing of keys between every sensor nodes and avoids large scale WSN
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compromise [23]. The proposed scheme does not protect the security of small WSNs and only
protects distributed sensor networks. Chan et al. proposed an approach to improve the security
under small scale attacks at the cost of greater vulnerability to large scale attacks. The approach uses
a scheme where cryptographic rekeying increases the resilience of the network against node captures
[24]. Xiao et al. key management survey results showed that pairwise key distribution schemes
are the best for network resilience by enforcing large fractions of the network to be compromised
to attain any significant gain [25]. All of the proposed key distribution algorithms accept a small
portion of the WSN to be compromised. If reverse engineering tactics are used to obtain copies of
the pair-wised keys then the whole WSN can eventually be compromised.
The second category is key revocation technologies that prevent the compromise of future encrypted information by revoking the keys shared with the compromised sensor node. Wang et al.
proposed the KeyRev technology that makes use of a centralized key revocation technique to prevent
future information leakage. The functionality of the KeyRev technology makes use of session keys
to prevent compromised sensors from obtain new session keys [50]. However, the problem of the
KeyRev technology is that it does not know how to detect if a sensor node has been compromised.
Chattopadhyay and Turuk proposed a similar approach; however, it is a decentralize approach where
each individual node is responsible for revoking keys shared between compromised sensor nodes. The
proposed technology made use of a voting scheme where sensor nodes vote on each other whether a
sensor is suspected to be a compromised node [51]. Both proposed technologies made the assumptions of having an IDS built in to one of the nodes on the WSN. The key revocation technologies
does protect a WSN from node capture attacks; however, making the assumption that a IDS is in
place is not reliable.
The third category is intrusion detection systems that detect capture nodes in a WSN. An
implemented example of an IDS was presented by Krontiris et al. where an IDS was deployed to
detect sinkhole attacks. The rules implemented in their IDS use the overhead route update packet
to check for the sender field and produce an alert if the sender ID is not one of the sensor IDs found
in the WSN [52]. Although the IDS did not directly detect node capture attacks, it can detect if
the capture node has been modified to use a different sensor ID. Another example of an IDS that
is more applicable to our scenario of node capture attacks was a proposed scheme by Sun et al.
The IDS scheme proposed made use of a pattern classification problem, in which classifiers were
designed to classify and observed activities as normal or intrusive [53]. The proposed scheme was
not implemented but proposed on paper. Not much research has been published on implementing
IDS for WSN because of the characteristics of the technology compared to wireless networks.
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The fourth category is intrusion prevention systems that prevent the use of capture nodes to
disclose sensitive information about a WSN. Out of all the categories discussed in this section, the
IPS category is the most promising in securing WSN from node capture attacks. In particular,
Priya and Sathyanarayana proposed a unique method of protecting the security of WSN from node
capture attacks by using a threshold secret sharing scheme. The threshold secret sharing scheme
divides the master key into several sub keys and as long as the attacker captures fewer than the
threshold, he/she cannot reconstruct the master key [54]. The threshold can be application specific
and protects the master secret key from being disclosed. Another prevention technology proposed
by Soroush et al. is to delete the master key after the key establishment has been accomplished
[55]. The proposed scheme makes the assumption that the master key eventually gets deleted from
memory in order to make the scheme more secure against node capture attacks [55]. We proved later
that this assumption is broken because an attacker can obtain the master key before it is deleted.

2.5

Node Tampering

Node capture attacks are often discussed as a potential vulnerability in WSNs; however, only few
papers have been published to prove the feasibility of such attacks [56]. Proposed papers date
back to 1997 with the most latest one written in 2008 that highlight node tampering attacks.
Skorobogatov describes in detail various node tampering attacks and has classified the techniques
into three categories: invasive, semi-invasive, and non-invasive attacks [57]. Invasive attacks require
access to the micro-controllers internals and typically make use of expensive equipment used in
manufacturing and testing. Semi-Invasive attacks require access to the micro-controllers internals
and typically make use of cheaper equipment and less time than invasive attacks. Non-invasive
attacks are the easiest that require access to the micro-controllers but does not require additional
equipment.
The invasive node capture attacks are more practical in a laboratory environment instead of infield type of attacks. Anderson and Kuhn discussed an invasive type of attack that used differential
fault analysis, where a micro-controller was exposed to low level of ionising radiation to introduce
one-bit errors [58]. Other examples from Anderson include the use of chip rewriting attack by
specifically targeting gates to overwrite memory locations [58]. A more practical invasive attack was
demonstrated by Goodspeed. The invasive attack consisted of implementing the BSLCracker 3.0
hardware that uses a voltage glitching attacks to skip over a ”jz $+0” loop and gain unauthorized
entry to the BSL [59]. The attack only applies to two versions of the MSP430: the F1101 and the
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F4618 chips.
The semi-invasive node capture attacks are more practical for in-field types of attacks. For
example, Deng et al. discussed an attack on the MICA motes where a computer, a programming
board, and a debugging interface (JTAG) device are all that is need it to physically access the
internals of a micro-controller [56]. However, we must keep in mind that the attack only works if the
JTAG fuse has not been blown. If the JTAG fuse is blown then access through JTAG is no longer
supported and is irreversible [60]. Another example of a semi-invasive attack was demonstrated by
Skorobogatov and Anderson by making use of inexpensive laser equipment. They demonstrated
that illumination to a target transistor causes it to conduct; thereby inducing a transient fault [61].
Both examples require the use of additional hardware that can be inconvenient when attacks are
performed in-field.
The non-invasive node capture attacks are the least expensive and are the ideal choice for in-field
types of attacks. A great example of a non-invasive attack was discussed by Becher. The attack
exploited the BSL password used to protect MSP430 micro-controllers. Becher demonstrated that
the 256-bit BSL password was vulnerable to brute force attacks by reducing the key space to 40 bits
[27]. Since the BSL password is stored at the address space as the IVT, the password is identical
to the IVT. The 256-bit password was first reduced to 240-bit by considering code addresses to be
aligned on a 16-bit word boundary, thus the least significant bit of every interrupt vector is 0. The
240-bit was reduced to 225-bit by considering that the reset interrupt or power-up interrupt was
always fixed to the start address of main memory. The 225-bit was reduced to 60-bit by considering
that in the worst case scenario the unused interrupts point to the same fixed address. The 60-bit
was further reduced to 40-bit by considering that code is placed by the compiler in a contiguous
area of memory starting at the lowest flash memory address, thus leaving with a key space of fewer
possible addresses. Becher suggested that the brute force time for 40-bit key space would be 128
years. Goodspeed was able to reduce the 128 years to 32 years by changing the baud rate of the
MSP430 to the highest supported baud rate of 38400 [28]. Although brute force can be reduced by
capturing more nodes, it is not practical to brute force in a matter of years.
This thesis uses a different approach from Becher and Goodspeed. We analyzed the IVT values
instead of reducing the number of bits in the key space. We analyzed the passwords to find any
patterns that are persistent between sensor applications and use the results to predict future passwords. Our results show that we have lowered the brute force time to a matter of days rather than
years.
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Chapter 3
Secure Temperature Monitoring System In A WSN Enviroment

In Chapter 2, we study various types of WSN environments and investigated different applications
such as monitoring and tracking applications. The number of applications that can be supported by
WSNs are numerous; however, most of the systems require an environment that is resource expensive.
Simulating a WSN environment can be very expensive [37][30][32][33][36][29], thus the cost outweighs
the sole purpose of our research. With that being said, in this chapter we implement the Secure
Temperature Monitoring System which we refer to it as STMS. STMS has similar features to the
three different temperature monitoring systems implemented by Boosawat et al.[38], Risteska et al.
[40] and Mon et al.[39]. However, to our knowledge our STMS is the only temperature monitoring
system that encrypts the communication in a WSN. Our STMS is able to securely monitor room
temperatures in real time in a university environment such as the Computer Science department at
James Madison University. Therefore, STMS is the proper choice to demonstrate the security flaw
found in the MSP430 family chips. Our chapter discusses the design of our STMS, implementation,
the modes of operation, system set up, system testing, and network monitoring using Wireshark.

3.1

Design

Figure 3.2 shows the WSN topology used with our STMS consisting of a computer used to display
temperature levels, a Coordinator used as a base station, a PPPSniffer used to monitor the WSN
and three End-Devices used to collect temperature levels. STMS makes use of a star topology where
the Coordinator serves as the central node and the three End-Devices serve as the end nodes. The
computer serves as an extension of the Coordinator to provide the user with a visual representation
of the temperature data collected by each End-Device. Furthermore, the PPPSniffer node is also
connected to the computer in order to provide a visual representation of the packets captured by
the PPPSniffer.
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Figure 3.1: The network topology of the STMS. The solid lines represent a physical connection and
the dashed lines represent a wireless connection.

• Computer:
The computer has a main role of displaying temperature data in real time. The computer
displays temperature data that was sent by the Coordinator through one of the computer’s
USB serial ports. In addition, the computer also displays capture packets sent by the
PPPSniffer through one of the computer’s USB serial ports using Wireshark.
• Coordinator:
The Coordinator has three main roles: listening for incoming packets, decrypting packets,
and forwarding packets. The Coordinator always listens for any incoming packets sent
by the End-Devices. The packets received by the Coordinator are encrypted temperature
readings collected by the End-Devices. The Coordinator will decrypt the packets using a
network-wide shared key and forward the decrypted data to the laptop. The sole purpose
of forwarding the packets to the laptop is to provide the user with a screen to display the
temperature readings.
• End-Device:
The three End-Devices roles are: collecting temperature readings, encrypting the temperature data, and sending the temperature data. The three End-Devices are to be placed
in three different rooms to periodically collect the current temperature of each room. The
End-Device uses a built-in sensor to collect real time temperature readings of each room
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[62]. The temperature readings are encrypted by the End-Devices using a network-wide
shared key and the encrypted data is sent to the Coordinator.
• PPPSniffer:
The PPPSniffer has two main roles: capturing packets and forwarding the packets. The
PPPSniffer is responsible for sniffing all traffic within the STMS. The PPPSniffer uses
Point-to-Point Protocol to forward the capture packets to the computer and the computer
will display the received packets using Wireshark. The PPPSniffer allows to monitor the
network traffic within our STMS and check for secure communication between motes.

3.2

Implementation

The two tasks to set up our WSN environment was to implement our STMS and connect/test the
necessary equipment. The hardware subsection provides the specifications of the TelosB motes used
within our STMS. The software subsection will provide details of the IDE used and the implementation of our STMS.

3.2.1

TelosB Platform

The three most popular motes for research purposes are: the MICAz motes, IRIS motes, and TelosB
motes [2]. The listed three motes are manufactured by MEMSIC, a sensing solutions company [63].
Although all three motes provide similar services, the best choice for our STMS is the TelosB mote.
The TelosB comes with an integrated Temperature, Light and Humidity sensor [62], where as the
MICAz and IRIS have expansion connecters for Light and Temperature sensors. The TelosB mote
did not require us to buy additional sensor hardware since it already comes with the three built in
sensors. Additionally, most of the applications in the TinyOS open source project have been tested
using TelosB motes and has a great reputation of being popular mote of research [64]. For someone
new to the WSN community the use of the TelosB motes eases the learning phase of the thesis
project. Therefore, we purchased 5 TelosB motes from MEMSIC at a price of $140 for each mote.
Figure 3.2 shows a front and back view of the TelosB mote [65].
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Figure 3.2: The top image shows the front of the TelosB mote. The bottom image shows the back
of the TelosB.

MCU Specifications:
The TelosB mote uses the ultra low power Texas Instrument MSP430-F1611 micro-controller.
The MSP430-F1611 is a 16-bit RISC processor capable of an extremely low active current consumption that permits the TelosB mote to run for years on a single pair of AA batteries [66].
The MSP430 MCU has an internal digitally controlled oscillator that if the power is at 3.6V may
operate at 8MHz. If the TelosB were plugged into a USB port at a power level of 3V then the
MCU speed would be roughly 7MHz. If the TelosB mote is powered by a pair of AA batteries
then the MCU speeds will vary depending on the power level provided by the batteries. Figure 3.3 shows the supply voltage versus the MCU speed[66]. The voltage versus MCU speeds
demonstrates how the battery life affects the overall functionality of the TelosB.
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Figure 3.3: Clock frequency vs. supply voltage for MSP430-F15x/F16x/F161x

Memory Specifications:
As shown in Table 3.1, the TelosB mote is equipped with a 10kB of RAM, 48 kB of flash memory,
16kB of EEPROM, and 1024kB of M25P80 External Flash memory [65]. The 10kB of RAM is
used when the TelosB mote is powered on to make use of program variables. The 48kB of
flash memory is used to store the users program in our case the Coodinator, End-Device or
PPPSniffer programs. The 16kB of EEPROM is used for mote hardware configuration purposes
like the sensor calibration coefficients. Lastly, the 1024kB for M25P80 External Flash memory is
used to store data logging information over time. It is important to note that the security flaw
found during our investigations involves the 48kB of flash memory.
Table 3.1: The 4 types of memories found in the TelosB mote.
Memory Type
RAM
Flash Memory
EEPROM
M25P80

Size
10kB
48kB
16kB
1024kB

Purpose
Store Variables
Store User Code
Store Mote Configurations
Store Data Over Time

Radio Specifications:
The TelosB mote is equipped with a Chipcon CC2420 radio chip to support wireless communications [43]. The CC2420 operates on 2.4 GHz to 2.4835 GHz ranges, which means it is in the
Industrial, Scientist Medical (ISM) band compliant. The data rate supported by the CC2420 is
250 kbps but data rates may drop depending on the power level. The CC2420 chip is also IEEE
802.15.4 compliant and has a built-in inline AES-128 encryption in which we make use of with
our STMS application.
Sensor Specifications:
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The TelosB mote has four integrated sensors that do not require additional hardware, unlike
the IRIS and MICAz motes [65]. The first two sensors are used to measure light levels, such
as measuring photosynthetically active radiation levels (S1087 sensor) and measuring the entire
visible spectrum (S1087-01 sensor). The other two sensors are used to measure the humidity
levels (SHT11 sensor) and temperature levels (SHT15 sensor) [62]. We only make use of the
SHT15 sensor to monitor the temperature levels with our STMS.
The specifications of the TelosB mote suggests that all sensor technologies are resource limited and
have low power consumption. Resources such as computation power, memory, and the communication bandwidth are to be kept in mind during a sensor application development process. Unlike
computers or smart phones, sensors are very limited in their capabilities and require special protocols
that keep low power consumption in mind.

3.2.2

Secure Temperature Monitoring System (STMS)

The Secure Temperature Monitoring System section is broken down into two parts: TinyOS IDE
and STMS Implementation. The TinyOS IDE subsection describes the process of setting up an
Integrated Development Environment for TinyOS. The STMS Implementation subsection discusses
details on how our application works and the roles of each mote in our network.
(A) TinyOS IDE
The first step to set up the WSN environment was to create/install a designated OS that was solely
used for research. In our case, we used OS X El Capitan as the host machine and Ubuntu 14.04 TLS
as the guest machine using VMWARE Fusion. The Ubuntu is a 64-bit architecture and runs a Linux
3.16.0-57-generic kernel. We choose TinyOS as the WSN OS because of the big community and the
popularity usage in sensor research. Other OS for sensors networks include Contiki and LiteOS;
however, both lack applications samples for the MSP430 chips[67]. TinyOS is an open source OS
designed for low-power wireless devices in which the reader may obtain a free copy from the TinyOS
Github Project[68]. TinyOS was written in nesC, which is programming language that incorporates
event-driven execution, a flexible concurrency model, and component-oriented application design[69].
Steps to install TinyOS:
1. Unzip the TinyOS project downloaded from Github [68]
2. Open a terminal window and cd into ../tinyos-main/tools
3. Execute the following commands to install the make system for TinyOS
• $ ./Bootstrap
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• $ ./configure
• $ make
• $ sudo make install
4. cd into /etc/apt/sources.list.d and execute the following commands to install TinyOS tools
development packages
• $ sudo echo ”deb http://tinyprod.net/repos/debian squeeze main” >> tinyprod-debian.list
• $ sudo echo ”deb http://tinyprod.net/repos/debian msp430-46 main” >> tinyprod-debian.list
• $ sudo apt-get update
• $ sudo apt-get install msp430-46 nesc tinyos-tools-devel
The next step was to install software that can support an IDE for TinyOS, the software needed
are Eclipse and Yeti2. Eclipse can be simply installed by downloading the latest Eclipse SDK version
from their website. After installing Eclipse, the next step was to install the Yeti2 Eclipse plugin for
TinyOS IDE support. Yeti2 is a nesC editor implemented as a plugin for Eclipse aim to provide
developers with the convenience functions expected from a modern development environment [70].
There are other IDE for TinyOS such as NESCDT [71] or TinyDT [72]; however, based on blogs
most of the developers recommend using Yeti2 due to its simplicity and user-friendly style.
Steps to install Yeti2:
1. Open Eclipse and go to Help > Install New Software
2. Click on Add to add a new repository
3. Use the following to create a new repository:
• $ Name: Yeti2
• $ Location: http://tos-ide.ethz.ch/update/site.xml
4. Make sure that the following boxes are checked:
• $ Yeti 2 Core
• $ Yeti2 Optional
• $ Yeti2 Environments (make sure the Yeti 2 TinyOS 2.x in Cygwin is unchecked)
5. Install Yeti2 and let Eclipse restart
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6. Open the TinyOS perspective by going to Window > Open Perspective > Other
7. Choose TinyOS and click OK
8. Set up the plugin environments by going to Window > Preferences
9. Select TinyOS > Environments > TinyOS 2.x unix-environment
10. Make sure TinyOS Root Directory, TinyOS TOS Directory, TinyOS Application Directory,
and TinyOS App Makerules reference the TinyOS installation
If all steps were followed correctly the reader should now have a TinyOS IDE for developing WSN
applications. In our case, we used our TinyOS IDE to implement STMS.
(B) STMS Implementation
The contribution of this thesis is to investigate the security flaw found in the MSP430-BSL password
that is used to protect flash memory firmware. To demonstrate the outcomes of dumping flash memory firmware, we reverse engineered our STMS End-Device application to obtain the cryptographic
keys. With that being said, our STMS is built on top of Layer 1 and Layer 2 of the OSI model.
Figure 3.4 shows the comparison of the OSI model between wireless networks and wireless sensor
networks [73]. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is similar to the 802.11 but the protocol is built on the
idea of low power consumption and limited transport rates of 250Kbps [74]. We make use of the
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol at the data link layer to establish an association between the Coordinator
and an End-Device. We also make use of the CC2420 inline AES-128 encryption at the physical
layer to encrypt the communication between the Coordinator and the End-Devices [43]. If the security is broken at the physical layer by obtaining copies of the cryptographic keys through reverse
engineering then all upper layers, like the 6LoWPAN protocol, Zigbee protocol and CoAP protocol
will be broken because of the OSI model domino effect. Additional reasons why we build on top of
the L1 and L2 layers is to limit the code size added when using the CoAP or 6LoWPAN protocols.
TinyOS provides sample applications that make use of the 6LoWPAN or CoAP protocols, but when
attempting to build the examples we encounter a ”region rom overflowed by N number of bytes”
error. Making use of the upper layers (6LoWPAN, Zigbee or CoAP) exceed the allotted TelosB
48kB rom size when compiling the application.
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Figure 3.4: A comparison of the OSI model between a wireless network (left) vs. a wireless sensor
network (right).

We have implemented two versions of our Secure Temperature Monitoring System: we call the
first version IEEE802154 and the second version L1-Secure. The IEEE802154 version is built on top
of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer, which allows an End-Device to associate with the Coordinator
before sending temperature reading packets. The communication in the IEEE802154 version is
unencrypted and the purpose is to demonstrate how motes can join the STMS network. The L1Secure version is built on top of the Physical layer (L1), which allows an End-Device to encrypt
the data before sending temperature reading packets to the Coordinator. The L1-Secure version
does not require the End-Device to associate with the Coordinator before sending the encrypted
packet. We have implemented two versions (IEEE802154 and L1-Secure) of STMS because at the
time of this writing there is no implementation of the secure MAC layer using the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol [74]. We have successfully built a secure WSN solely using the L1 layer, thus avoiding any
implementation required to include the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer. Since the purpose of this thesis
is the security of firmware at the L1 layer and not the upper layers, then building on top of the L1
layer suffices the proof of concept. The STMS code has been made open source for research purposes
and can be downloaded from our GitHub project[75].
• Coodinator:
As previously mentioned, the Coordinator is the central node of our STMS. Since we
have two versions of the Coordinator the operations slightly vary between the IEEE802154
version and the L1-Secure version. Both versions support the operations of listening for
incoming packets and forwarding the received data. The difference is that the IEEE802154

21

version supports association responses and the L1-secure version supports decryption. To
support association responses the IEEE802154 version uses the MAC sub-Layer Management Entity (MLME) interface provided by TinyOS. The MLME interface provides
access to the management services provided by the MAC sub-layer. In particular, the
following MLME components are used: MLME RESET, MLME SET, MLME START,
MLME ASSOCIATE, and MLME COMM STATUS. The MLME RESET allows the Coordinator to request a MLME reset and initialize the MAC to be able to use other MAC
primitives. The MLM SET is used to set the values on the Personal Area Network Information Base (PIB), which is a database that stores information to manage the MAC layer.
MLME START is used to begin acting as Coordinator of a PAN and will always be called
after the MLME SET. The MLME ASSOCIATE is used to notify the Coordinator that an
End-Device has requested to associate with the PIB. The MLME COMM STATUS is used
to indicate communication status between the Coordinator and the End-Devices. As far
as listening for incoming packets, the IEEE802154 version uses the MCPS DATA interface
where as the L1-Secure version uses the Receive interface. The decryption operation of the
L1-Secure version makes use of the CC2420Keys interface to set or ”send” the key from
the MSP430 flash memory to the CC2420 chip. When a packet is received the payload is
decrypted by the CC24020 chip using a network wide shared key. The actual data content
received by the Coordinator is a 14-bit digital readout value that is converted to Fahrenheit
using the follow formula in (3.1)[62]. The final operation requires both versions to forward
the temperature reading to the Ubuntu VM in order to print the Node ID and Fahrenheit
value on the screen. The C printf library is used to display the temperature readings on
the screen using the Serial port terminal tool available on the Ubuntu Software Center.
−39.3 + (0.018 × data)

(3.1)

• End-Device:
The End-Devices are the end-nodes of our STMS; they are responsible for collecting temperature readings of various locations. Similar to the Coordinator, we have two versions of
the End-Device with slight variation between the IEEE802154 version and the L1-Secure
version. Both versions support the operations of collecting temperature readings and sending temperature packets to the Coordinator. The difference is that the IEEE802154 version
supports association requests, where as the L1-secure version supports encryption. To support association requests the IEEE802154 version uses the MAC sub-Layer Management
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Entity (MLME) interface provided by TinyOS. In particular, the following MLME components are used: MLME RESET, MLME SET, MLME GET, and MLME ASSOCIATE.
The MLME RESET, MLME SET, and MLME ASSOCIATE have the same roles as discussed in the Coordinator section. The new interface used with the End-Device is the
MLME GET, which is used to get specific information about the PIB. Both versions require collecting temperature readings using the built-in temperature sensor SHT15. The
SensirionSht11C interface is used by both versions to read temperature levels in real time
using the SHT15 sensor. The IEEE802154 reads temperatures every 5 seconds, where as
the L1-Secure reads temperatures every 3 seconds. The temperature reading is a 14-bit
digital output value that is sent to the Coordinator along with the Node ID. However,
before sending the data the L1-Secure version encrypts the payload of the packet by using
the CC2420Keys interface and CC2420SecurityMode interface. The CC2420Keys interface
is used to set or ”send” the network wide shared key from the MSP430 chip to the CC2420
chip. The CC2420SecurityMode interface is used to set AES-128-CTR security mode in
order to encrypt the payload portion of the packets. The final operation requires both versions to send the temperature packets to the Coordinator. The IEEE802154 version uses the
MCPS DATA interface to send the temperature packets to the Coordinator after an association has been established. The L1-Secure version uses the AMSend interface to send the
encrypted temperature packets to the Coordinator with no pre-association establishments.
• PPPSniffer:
The PPPSniffer node has one main role of capturing packets being sent from the EndDevices to the Coordinator in our STMS. TinyOS provides the PPPSniffer application that
can be linked to Wireshark. The application is found under the /tinyos-main/apps/PPPSniffer
directory of the TinyOS Github Project [68]. The application receives and snoops packets on the IEEE 802.15.4 channel and forwards the packets to the Ubuntu VM using the
Point-to-Point protocol. The Ubuntu VM then uses Wireshark to allow us to view details
about the packets being sent on our STMS network or any WSN.

3.3

System Testing

The following section will provide the steps to set up STMS along with the PPPSniffer to display
the capture packets using Wireshark. We assume the TinyOS IDE (refer to Section 3.2.2) has
been setup and the STMS code has been downloaded from our GitHub project[75]. To avoid any
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path compilation errors, it is important that the downloaded STMS code is stored under the /tinymain/apps directory. The first step of setting up the WSN environment is to plugin the TelosB
motes to USB ports found on a computer. Figure 3.5 shows a USB Hub we setup to allow us to
plugin all our TelosB motes to the computer that is running the Ubuntu VM. Furthermore, using
a terminal window on the Ubuntu VM we ran the motelist command to list all the current motes
recognized by the Ubuntu VM. Figure 3.6 displays the output of the motelist commands which
matches the labels and TelosB motes seen in Figure 3.5. We are now ready to flash the PPPSniffer,
IEEE802154, and L1-Secure applications to the plugged in TelosB motes.

Figure 3.5: A picture taken of our USB hub and TelosB motes and the corresponding port number

Figure 3.6: The output of the mostelist command
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• PPPSniffer Setup
The PPPSniffer requires the Wireshark tool, which can installed by either obtaining a copy
from the Ubuntu Software Manager or using the apt-get command. The two procedures to
setup the PPPSniffer will be the same for both STMS versions. The setup consists of first
flashing the PPPSniffer application to the mote that is plugged in to the /dev/ttyUSB2 port.
The second step is to establish an internet link between the /dev/ttyUSB2 port and the ppp
interface using the pppd command.
Steps to setup PPPSniffer:
1. Open a terminal window
2. $cd /opt/tinyos-main/apps/PPPSniffer
3. $make telosb cc2420x 32khz install,1 bsl,/dev/ttyUSB2
4. $sudo pppd debug passive noauth nodetach 115200 /dev/ttyUSB2 nocrtscts nocdtrcts
lcp-echo-interval 0 noccp noip ipv6 ::23,::24
5. The last line of the previous command output should be ”Script /etc/ppp/ipv6-up finished
(pid 14415), status = 0x0”
6. The terminal window should be left open
• STMS Setup
The setup procedures between the two versions of IEEE802154 and L1-Secure are the same
except they differ in flashing the appropriate application. However, the same procedures should
be followed to flash the Coordinator and the three End-Devices on either versions. Setting up
the Coordinator requires additional steps compared to the PPPSniffer setup steps. The first
step is to flash the Coordinator application to the mote that is plugged in to the /dev/ttyUSB0
port. The second step is to establish an internet link between the /dev/ttyUSB0 port and the
ppp interface using the pppd command. The third step is add the ppp1 interfaces to the list
network interfaces by using the ifconfig command. The last step is to open up Wireshark and
start capturing packets on the ppp0 interface.
Steps to setup Coordinator:
1. Open a terminal window
2. $cd /opt/tinyos-main/apps/STMS/IEEE802154/Coordinator/src (for IEEE802154 version) or
$cd /opt/tinyos-main/apps/STMS/L1-Secure/Coordinator/src (for L1-Secure version)
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3. $make telosb install.1 bsl,/dev/ttyUSB0
4. $sudo pppd debug passive noauth nodetach 115200 /dev/ttyUSB0 nocrtscts nocdtrcts
lcp-echo-interval 0 noccp noip ipv6 ::25,::26
5. The output of the previous command should be interval messages of
”sent [LCP ConfReq id=0x1 <asyncmap 0x0> <magic 0xc9580e> <pcomp> <accomp>]”
6. The terminal window should be left open
7. Open a new terminal window
8. $sudo ifconfig ppp1 add fec0::101/64
9. $sudo wireshark
10. Wireshark will start and proceed to capture packets on the ppp0 interface.
The steps to setup the End-Devices is straight forward because it only requires flashing the
End-Device application to the three End-Device motes.
Steps to setup End-Devices:
1. Open a terminal window
2. $cd /opt/tinyos-main/apps/STMS/IEEE802154/End-Device/src (for IEEE802154 version) or
$cd /opt/tinyos-main/apps/STMS/L1-Secure/End-Device/src (for L1-Secure version)
3. $make telosb install.4 bsl,/dev/ttyUSB1 (for sensor in Room 4)
4. $make telosb install.6 bsl,/dev/ttyUSB3 (for sensor in Room 6)
5. $make telosb install.8 bsl,/dev/ttyUSB4 (for sensor in Room 8)

3.3.1

IEEE802154 Capture Packets & Analysis

The IEEE802154 version of the STMS makes use of the LED lights for demonstration purposes and
checking if the application is working as expected. As shown in Figure 3.7 there are various lights
turned on for each TelosB. The TelosB mote in port USB0 is the Coordinator which blinks the
green LED light for every successful End-Device association and blinks the blue light for every packet
received. The TelosB motes in ports USB1, USB3 and USB4 are the the End-Devices, which turn
on the green LED light when successfully establishing a association with the Coordinator and blink
the blue LED light for every packet sent. The TelosB mote in port USB2 is the PPPSniffer which
blinks the green LED light for every packet capture and the red LED light for every capture packet
sent to the computer.
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Figure 3.7: A picture taken of our USB hub and TelosB motes with the IEEE802154 version and
PPPSniffer running

To display the actual temperature readings collected from the End-Device we use the Serial Port
Terminal (SPT), which can be installed through the Ubuntu Software Center. Once opened the SPT
requires setting the proper configurations by clicking on ”Configurations > Port” then setting the
Port field to /dev/ttyUSB0 and Baud Rate field to 115200. Figure 3.8 shows the results of displaying
the data received by the Coordinator which is plugged in to port USB0. As we can see from the
results, the sensors located in Room 4 and Room 8 were reading temperature levels of 81o F or 82o F .
The two sensors were located in the same graduate lab room in the Computer Science Department at
James Madison University. The environment for sensor 6 was changed to demonstrate that sensors
can be powered by batteries and may collect different temperature levels. We used two double AA
batteries to power sensor 6 and placed the sensor in our graduate lab refrigerator. As seen in the
results, the temperature readings for Room 6 were 48o F or 49o F , which was the same temperature
set in the refrigerator. We must point out that the temperature readings may be affected by 1o F or
2o F due to heat generated by the MSP430 when constantly being used.
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Figure 3.8: The output generated by the serial port terminal, which displays temperature readings
received by the Coordinator

The information collected by Wireshark shows detailed traffic going across our STMS IEEE802154
network and the results have been saved in the IEEE802154.pcapng file, which can be accessed
through our Github project [75]. Before analyzing the information, Wireshark must be configured
properly to interpret IEEE 802.15.4 packets. First click on ”Edit > Preferences...”, then on the
Wireshark Preferences - Profile window select ”Protocols > IEEE 802.15.4” and make sure that
the ”TI CC24xx FCS format” box is checked. Apply the new settings and, once the Wireshark
Preferences - Profile window closes, right click on any of the packets and click on ”Decode as...”.
On the Wireshark Decode As window select the link tab and make sure the value for the Ethertype
0x86dd value ”IEEE 802.15.4” is selected. The capture packets between the Coordinator and the
End-Devices will be decoded as IEEE 802.15.4 format and will make the interpretation process easier. Figure 3.9 shows the results of capturing packets going across the STMS IEEE802154 network.
As we can see from the results, packets 1, 2 and 3 belong to the association between the Coordinator
and the first End-Device sensor. Packets 4, 5, and 6 belong to the association between the Coordinator and the second End-Device sensor. Packets 8, 9, and 10 belong to the association between the
Coordinator and the third End-Device sensor. The rest of the packets are the temperature readings
collected by the End-Devices and sent to the Coordinator.
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Figure 3.9: The packets going across the STMS IEEE802154 network.

Figure 3.10 shows details about packet 1, which is the Association Request packet sent by the
End-Device to the Coordinator. Some of the interesting fields found are the Destination Personal
Area Network (PAN), Destination, Source PAN, and Extended Source. A sensor device will either
have an extended address (also known as ”unique address”) or a short address that was allocated by
the PAN Coordinator when the End-Device associated[74]. The destination PAN identifier address
0x1234 allows communication between PANs and serves transmissions between End-Devices across
independent networks. The destination address 0x9999 is the short address of the Coordinator and
was predefined along with the destination PAN during the development of the STMS IEEE802154.
The source PAN address 0xffff is the short address of the End-Device and by default is set to
0xffff if the End-Device has not yet been associated with a PAN. The extended source address
01:01:48:43:54:2f:26:b5 is the unique address of the End-Device requesting to join the PAN. As
shown in Figure 3.11, the response sent by the Coordinator to the End-Device is an Association
Response packet. In this case, the extended source address 00:00:83:4e:21:ac:75:e2 is the unique
address of the Coordinator. The short address assigned to the End-Device by the Coordinator is
0x002b, which is unique with the 0x1234 PAN. The Coordinator assigns short addresses to new EndDevices that join the network by incrementing from the previously assigned address. In this case the
next End-Device that joins the network will receive the value of 0x002c. The short address value will
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be reset to 0x0000 when the Coordinator has rebooted by pressing the reset button on the motes.
Once the association has been established the communication continues by sending temperature
readings from the End-Device to the Coordinator. Figure 3.12 shows the hex values found on the
payload section of the packet. The payload consists of 8 bytes, where the first four bytes 0x0004,
or 4, is the Node ID and the last 4 bytes 0x1b13, or 6913, is the temperature data. If we convert
the 6913 to Fahrenheit using the Sensirion formula we get −39.3 + (0.018 × 6913) or 85o F . The
temperature value has increased because the motes were running for a long period of time; therefore,
sending temperature packets every 3 seconds affected the temperature sensor by 3o F .

Figure 3.10: An example of the association request packet sent from the End-Device to the Coordinator.
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Figure 3.11: An example of the association response packet sent from the Coordinator to the EndDevice.

Figure 3.12: An example of the payload portion found in the packet sent from the End-Device to
the Coordinator.

3.3.2

L1-Secure Capture Packets & Analysis

The L1-Secure version of STMS also makes use of the LED lights for demonstration purposes and
checking if the application is working as expected. As shown in Figure 3.13, there are fewer lights
turned on compared to the IEEE802154 version. The TelosB mote in port USB0 is the Coordinator,
which blinks the blue LED light for every packet received. The TelosB motes in ports USB1, USB3
and USB4 are the the End-Devices, which blink the blue LED light for every packet sent. The
TelosB mote in port USB2 is the PPPSniffer, which blinks the green LED light for every packet
captured and the red LED light for every capture packet sent to the computer.
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Figure 3.13: A picture taken of our USB hub and TelosB motes with the IEEE802154 and PPPSniffer
running

Similar to the IEEE802154 version, we display the data received by the Coordinator using the
Serial Port Terminal (SPT) tool in our L1-Secure version. Figure 3.14 shows the results of displaying
the data received by the Coordinator plugged in to port USB0. The results show the sensors located
in Room 4 and Room 8 were reading temperature levels of 83o F to 85o F . Again, the sensors were
reading higher temperatures because the motes had been running for an extended period of time,
thus making the MSP430 chips produce heat. If the sensors were programmed to the collected
temperature measurements every 3 hours, instead of 3 seconds, then the temperature measurements
would be more accurate. We can also observe from the results that the sensor in Room 6 was no
where to be found and, instead, random data was displayed. We modified the code for the sensor
in Room 6 to use a different key than the network wide shared key, thus the Coordinator was not
able to decrypt the message sent by the sensor in Room 6. The purpose was to demonstrate that
if the correct key is not used then the Coordinator can be programmed to ignore the ”garbage,” or
random data.
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Figure 3.14: The output generated by the serial port terminal, which displays temperature readings
received by the Coordinator

Figure 3.15: The packets going across the STMS L1-Secure network.

The detailed traffic collected by Wireshark for the STMS L1-Secure network is found in the
L1-Secure.pcapng file, which can be accessed through our Github project[75]. The same procedures
discussed in the previous sample were used to Decode the packets to IEEE 802.15.4 format. Figure 3.9
shows the results of capturing packets going across the STMS L1-Secure network. All of the packets
are data packets sent by the End-Devices to the Coordinator. We do not see any Association packets
because the L1-Secure version does not require the End-Devices to associate with the Coordinator.
The End-Devices will collect temperature levels, encrypt the payload of a packet and ”broadcast”
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the temperature packets on the network. Therefore, any motes within the range of communication
will be able to capture the broadcast packets but will not be able to interpret the data without
the encryption key. Figure 3.16 shows an example of a mote ”PPPSniffer” that is within the range
collecting the packets going across the L1-Secure network. The samples show the hex values found
on the payload section of three packets sent by the sensor in Room 4 to the Coordinator. The data
is supposed to be the Node ID along with the temperature data; however, the data appears to be
random. The payload portion of the packets are being encrypted by the network wide shared key
used by the Coordinator and End-Devices. If the PPPSniffer knew the network wide shared key
then the eavesdropper would be able to decrypt the traffic in the L1-Secure network.

(a) Sensor 4 Sample 1

(b) Sensor 4 Sample 2

(c) Sensor 4 Sample 3

Figure 3.16: An example of the encrypted payload portion found in the packet sent from the EndDevice in Room 4 to the Coordinator.

3.4

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we contributed a working implementation of our Secure Temperature Monitoring
System. We discussed our approach of using a star topology, where the central node was the Coordinator and the end nodes were the End-Devices. The STMS design has two versions: one version
supporting associations between sensors and the second version supporting encrypted communications. We used TinyOS to implement our STMS as well as the TelosB motes to test our STMS. The
association between the Coordinator and End-Device was first established before sending the tem-
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perature reading to the Coordinator. The temperature readings are encrypted by the End-Devices
before sending them to the Coordinator. We deployed a TelosB mote as a packet sniffer to check
the functionality of the STMS. Our results show that our STMS was successfully able to associate
sensors that join the network, as well as encrypt the communication within our STMS network.
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Chapter 4
Breaking The MSP430-BSL Password

With the Secure Temperature Monitoring System in place, this chapter discusses how the security
of a WSM environment can be broken. As mentioned in Chapter 2 there has been numerous
proposals presented to improve the security of WSNs; however, most of them are concentrated in
the Application, Network, and Link layers [4][9][1][11][14][13][15][12][16][42][17][8][18]. Most of the
security research papers make node capture attack assumptions with no details on the outcome
of having direct physical access to the sensor node [23][24][25][51][50][52][53][54][55]. Therefore, the
purpose of Chapter 4 is to evaluate the time needed to break into a TelosB mote and dump firmware.
First, a brief discussion of the two methods used to program MSP430 chips will be reviewed. Next,
the password used to protect access to the MSP430 firmware will be analyzed. Lastly, the process
of brute forcing the password to get access to MSP430 and dump the firmware will be investigated.

4.1

Programming the MSP430

The MSP430 can be programmed in two different ways. The first way is through the use of JTAG
connector, which requires additional hardware. The second and more convenient way is through the
use of the USB serial bootstrap loader (BSL).
1. JTAG
The TelosB motes support MSP430 programing through the use of the JTAG 8-pin 2mm
connector. In addition to programming, the JTAG connector allows on-chip debugging, single
stepping through code, reading from memory, and writing to memory. Texas Instrument
provides the FET debugger, which is a USB interface that connects to the JTAG interface to
allow programing and debugging MSP430 code [60]. For the most part the JTAG connector
is mainly used by developers to test the functionality of their equipment. With that being
said, access to the JTAG is unprotected, allowing anyone with a JTAG adapter full access
to code store in flash memory or RAM. In our case, the JTAG interface allowed us to access
the STMS application and locate the encryption keys used for our secure WSN environment.
Furthermore, proprietary firmware can be easily downloaded using the JTAG interface and
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dumped code can be replicated for personal benefit [57]. To prevent unwanted access to the
JTAG interface, the MSP430 provides a feature of fuse blowing. The JTAG port is protected
by a fuse; blowing the fuse completely disables the entire JTAG test circuitry in the microcontroller and is irreversible [60]. Once the fuze is blown the only way to program the MSP430
is through the USB bootstrap loader.
2. BSL
Unlike the JTAG interface, access to the USB bootstrap loader (BSL) is password protected,
which makes it ideal for after production. Furthermore, the MSP430-BSL interface provides
access to flash memory as well as RAM, making the programing task easier by not requiring
additional hardware. Even after the JTAG fuse has been blown, the BSL interface continues to
function as expected making it optimal for in the field mote maintenance. The MSP430-BSL
is a unique code located in a factory-masked boot ROM, which does not allow write or erase
access to prevent the BSL code from being altered. The BSL code consists of commands that
use the UART protocol with RS232 interfacing to allow communication between a computer
and the MSP430 [26]. The key feature of the MSP430-BSL is the restricted commands allowed
if the user does not have the password. Table 4.1 shows the commands allowed with and
without the password.
Table 4.1: MSP430-BSL Commands Allowed Without vs. With The Password
Command
Mass Erase
Transmit BSL Version
Change Baud Rate
Receive Password
Receive Data Block
Transmit Data Block
Erase Segment
Erase Check
Set Memory Offset
Load Program Counter
Start User Program

Without Password
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

With Password
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

In Table 4.1 full access to the MSP430 is allowed only if the user provides the correct password. If no
password is provided then the only useful commands allowed to the user is to send the password to
the MSP430 or mass erase all of the content in the MSP430 flash memory. The mass erase will allow
full access to the mote since the password will be reset to default (details will be provided in Section
4.2). Mass erasing the flash memory defeats the purpose of getting access to the firmware stored
in the MSP430 mote. Therefore, providing the correct password is ideal to obtaining meaningful
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information about the applications stored in sensor nodes. We are interested in the Transmit Data
Block command, which is only allowed if the correct password has be entered. The Transmit Data
Block command allowed us to dump the firmware found in flash memory, which later can be reverse
engineered to get encryption keys used in a secure WSN environment. Furthermore, proprietary
firmware can also be obtained if the correct password is entered. We have left details about the
password for a dedicated section since the main security flaw of MSP430 is found with the password
used for the BSL.

4.2

Analyzing The BSL Password

The MSP430-BSL used a 32-bytes password to protect firmware found in flash memory. As discussed
in the previous section, the memory address used for the MSP430-BSL password was the same as
the Interrupt Vector Table (IVT); therefore, the BSL password was identical to the IVT. Since the
password was the IVT, the BSL password resides at the top of the memory at address 0xFFFE to the
memory address 0xFFE0 (refer to Figure 5.1). Furthermore, the 32-bytes password was broken down
into sixteen values, each 2-bytes (16-bit addressing) in size. Each of the 2-bytes values corresponds
to the address of an interrupt handler. With that being said, Figure 4.1 shows the Interrupt Vector
Table for the MSP430F15x, MSP430F16x, and MSP430F161x chips [66]. In order to understand how
the MSP430-BSL password is generated we had to understand how the IVT was created. First of all,
the address that was generated for each interrupt vector handler was dependent on the application
used and the compiler version. For instance, if the application being compiled used various event
handlers then the values in the IVT would change accordingly. Furthermore, different compiler
versions would generate different address values for each interrupt vector handler. Second of all, we
must discuss in detail how the address for each interrupt handler was determined by examining the
16 interrupt handlers supported by the MSP430 chips. Before discussing each interrupt handler,
we must highlight some of the data found in Figure 4.1. As we can see from priority column, the
highest priority level of 15 was located at the top of the memory address (0xFFFE). The priority
level decreased as the memory address decreased all the way up to the lowest priority level of 0,
located at the bottom of the memory address (0xFFE0). As we discuss more about each interrupt
handler, we will reference the values located in each column of Figure 4.1 [66].
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Figure 4.1: The interrupt vector table for the MSP430F15x, MSP430F16x, and MSP430F161x chips.

• 0xFFFE: WDTIFG, KEYV
The watchdog timer interrupt flag (WDTIFG) is responsible for handling any system resets
due to any security key violations (KEYV), reset on VCC power-on, or a reset on application
malfunction [60].
• 0xFFFC: NMIIFG, OFIFG, ACCVIFG
The non-maskable interrupt flag (NMIIFG) is responsible for handling non-recoverable
hardware errors. The oscillator fault interrupt flag (OFIFG) is responsible for handling
any oscillator rate errors. The flash memory access violation interrupt flag (ACCVIFG) is
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responsible for handling any erase or programming requests sent while the flash memory is
busy [76].
• 0xFFFA: TBCCR0 CCIFG
The Timer B7 is one of the two general purpose 16-bit counters that counts up until the
value in the TBCCR0 register is reached. The capture/compare interrupt flag (CCIFG) is
set once the counter has reached the value store in TBCCR0 register. The CCIFG will be
set until the interrupt request has been handled and will be reset to 0 after completion[77].
• 0xFFF8: TBCCR1 to TBCCR6 CCIFGs, TBIFG
The Timer B7 is one of the two general purpose 16-bit counters that counts up until the
value in either TBCCR1 through TBCCR6 registers is reached. The capture/compare
interrupt flag (CCIFG) is set once the counter has reached the value store in either TBCCR1
through TBCCR6 registers. The CCIFG will be set until the interrupt request has been
handled and will be reset to 0 after completion. The timer rollover interrupt flag (TBIFG)
will be set when the timer counts down from the value in TACCR0 register to 0 [77].
• 0xFFF6: CAIFG
The comparator a interrupt flag (CAIFG) is responsible for handing any analog-to-digital
conversions, battery-voltage supervision, and monitoring of external analog signals [60].
• 0xFFF4: WDTIFG
The watchdog timer interrupt flag (WDT) is responsible for handling any system resets
software problem that occurs. The watchdog timer can also be configured to serve as an
interval timer and will generate interrupts at selected time intervals[66].
• 0xFFF2: URXIFG0
The UART and SPI receive interrupt flags (URXIFG0) are responsible for handling serial
data communication through the universal synchronous/asynchronous receiver peripheral.
The USART0 supports synchronous SPI, asynchronous UART and I2C communication
protocols using the receive buffer channel[66].
• 0xFFF0: UTXIFG0 I2CIFG
The UART and SPI transmit interrupt flags (URXIFG0) are responsible for handling serial
data communication through the universal synchronous/asynchronous transmit peripheral.
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The USART0 supports synchronous SPI, asynchronous UART and I2C communication
protocols using the transmit buffer channel [66]. The I2C interrupt flag is set when I2C is
being used for the serial data communication.
• 0xFFEE: ADC12IFG
The ADC12 interrupt vector flag (ADC12IFG) is responsible for handling efficient analogto-digital conversions through the use of a 16 work conversion-and-control buffer[66]
• 0xFFEC: TACCR0 CCIFG
The Timer A3 is one of the two general purpose 16-bit counters that counts up until the
value in the TACCR0 register is reached. The capture/compare interrupt flag (CCIFG) is
set once the counter has reached the value store in TACCR0 register. The CCIFG will be
set until the interrupt request has been handled and will be reset to 0 after completion[77].
• 0xFFEA: TACCR1 and TACCR2 CCIFGs, TAIFG
The Timer A3 is one of the two general purpose 16-bit counters that counts up until the
value in either TACCR1 or TACCR2 registers is reached. The capture/compare interrupt
flag (CCIFG) is set once the counter has reached the value store in any of the TACCR1 or
TACCR2 registers. The CCIFG will be set until the interrupt request has been handled
and will be reset to 0 after completion. The timer rollover interrupt flag (TAIFG) will be
set when the timer counts down from the value in TACCR0 register to 0 [77].
• 0xFFE8: P1IFG.0 to P1IFG.7
The port 1 interrupt flag (P1IFG.#) is responsible for handling general Input and Output
interrupts. Each interrupt flag has the I/O following description [66]:
– IFG.0 - clock signal TACLK input
– IFG.1 - capture: CCI0A input and compare: Out0 output/BSL transmit
– IFG.2 - capture: CCI1A input, compare: Out1 output,
– IFG.3 - capture: CCI2A input, compare: Out2 output
– IFG.4 - signal output
– IFG.5 - compare: Out0 output
– IFG.6 - compare: Out1 output
– IFG.7 - compare: Out2 output
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• 0xFFE6: URXIFG1
The UART and SPI receive interrupt flags (URXIFG1) are responsible for handling serial
data communication through the universal synchronous/asynchronous receiver peripheral.
The USART1 supports synchronous SPI and asynchronous UART communication protocols
using the receive buffer channel[66].
• 0xFFE4: UTXIFG1
The UART and SPI transmit interrupt flags (URXIFG1) are responsible for handling serial
data communication through the universal synchronous/asynchronous transmit peripheral.
The USART1 supports synchronous SPI and asynchronous UART communication protocols
using the transmit buffer channel[66].
• 0xFFE2: P2IFG.0 to P2IFG.7
The port 2 interrupt flag (P2IFG.#) is responsible for handling general Input and Output
interrupts. Each interrupt flag has the I/O following description [66]:
– IFG.0 - output
– IFG.1 - clock signal at INCLK
– IFG.2 - capture: CCI0B input/Comparator A output/BSL receive
– IFG.3 - compare: Out1 output/Comparator A input
– IFG.4 - compare: Out2 output/Comparator A input
– IFG.5 - external resistor defining the DCO nominal frequency
– IFG.6 - 12-bit ADC/DMA channel 0 external trigger
– IFG.7 - compare: Out0 output
• 0xFFE0: DAC12 0IFG, DAC12 1IFG, DMA0IFG, DMA1IFG, DMA2IFG
The DAC12 interrupt flags (DAC12 0IFG and DAC12 1IFG) are responsible for handling
any digital-to-analog conversion and are used in conjunction with the DMA controller. The
DMA interrupt flags (DMA0IFG, DMA1IFG and DMA2IFG) are responsible for handling
any movement of data from one memory address to another without CPU intervention[66].

4.3

Breaking The BSL Password

The following section will be broken down into four subsections in order to help the reader understand
the process of breaking the MSP430-BSL password. The first section will discuss the time it takes
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to brute force the 32-bytes MSP430-BSL password. The second section will discuss how a sample
of passwords were collected using various sensor applications. The third section will discuss the
technique used in this thesis to predict the MSP430-BSL password. Lastly, the fourth section
will discuss the time it takes to break the MSP430-BSL password using our password prediction
technique.

4.3.1

Brute Forcing The MSP430-BSL 32-bytes Password

To brute force the 32-bytes (256-bit) MSP430-BSL password required a significant amount of time.
A key that is 256-bits in length has a key space of 2256 or 1.1579 × 1077 possible keys. Brute forcing
a 256-bit key space is unreasonable but for the sake of argument we evaluated how long it takes
to brute force the MSP430-BSL 32-bytes password using our TelosB motes. To demonstrate how
long it takes to check a password we used our IEEE802154 Coordinator application as an example.
The correct password for our tests is the IVT table generated by the compiler when building out
IEEE802154 Coordinator application. We implemented a python script that calculated the time it
took to check the correct password vs the incorrect password with our TelosB mote. The pwd-timecheck.py script can be accessed through our Github project [75]. Figure 4.2 shows the time it took
to check 1, 200, 400, 600, and 1000 correct passwords and incorrect passwords. The data presented
in the graph is an average time of 10 trials performed to check the correct password (Table A.1)
and 10 trials to check the incorrect password (Table A.2). The results show the time to guess a
correct password vs a incorrect password is equivalent. Our results are roughly the same as the ones
presented by Becher et al. [27].
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Figure 4.2: The bar graph above displays the time it takes in seconds to guess N number of correct
passwords and incorrect passwords.

The results show us that on average the TelosB mote is able to check 15 passwords per second
regardless if the password is correct or incorrect. However, we were able to increase the passwords
check significantly by changing the baud rates. The results in Figure 4.2 are an average of checking
the passwords using the default BSL baud rate of 9600. Our TelosB mote supported baud rates
up to 38400; therefore, significantly increasing the number of passwords checked per second. Using
the same pwd-time-check.py script we added a code to change the default baud rate of 9600 to
the maximum supported TelosB baud rate of 38400. Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of using the
default baud rate of 9600 to a faster TelosB baud rate of 38400. Similar procedures were followed
by checking 1, 200, 400, 600, and 1000 passwords with 10 trials (Table A.3). The results show us
that on average the TelosB mote using a baud rate 38400 was able to check 38 passwords per second
regardless if the password was correct or incorrect. That is 23 passwords more per second than using
the default baud rate of 9600. Our results are roughly the same as the ones presented by Goodspeed
[28].
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Figure 4.3: The bar graph above display the time it takes in seconds to guess N number of correct
passwords using different baud rates (9600 vs 19200 vs 38400).

With that being said, using a baud rate of 38400 allowed us to guess 38 passwords per second
or 2280 passwords per minute. To brute force a key space of 2256 would require 9.66 × 1067 (4.1)
years! Becher et al. [27] was actually able to reduce the 9.66 × 1067 years to 128 years by evaluating
MSP430-BSL password bits. The 256-bit password was reduced to a 40-bit password by considering
that MSP430 instructions must be even-aligned (240-bit), the reset vector always points to the
beginning of main memory (225-bit), not all interrupts are used (60-bits), and assuming that the
program uses 2kb of flash memory (40-bits)[27]. Furthermore, Goodspeed[28] was able to reduce the
128 years to 32 years by making use of the 38400 baud rate. However, 32 years is still not practical
and further key space reduction is necessary to make the breaking of the MSP430-BSL password
plausible.
((((2256 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24) ÷ 365)

4.3.2

or

9.66 × 1067

(4.1)

Generating Password Samples

The best way to reduce the brute force times for the MSP430-BSL password is to use a pattern/prediction technique instead of reducing the bits. In order to predict a password we first had
to collect password samples to analyze and evaluate. Since the MSP430-BSL password is identical
to IVT, then we needed various MSP430 sensor applications to generate password samples. Luckily
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for us, TinyOS provides numerous sensor applications under their /tinyos-main/apps directory[68].
A bash script was implemented to iterate through all the applications under the /apps directory to
build each application. Building the application generates an Intel HEX (main.ihex) file, which was
the binary representation of the application in ASCII text format. The main.ihex file contains the
IVT; therefore, the bash script uses a python script to dump the IVT from the main.ihex file. Both
the bash script generate-pwds.sh and the pythons script dump-pwd.py can be accessed through our
Github project [75].
Unfortunately, out of the 200 TinyOS application samples, only 93 were able to be successfully
compiled and build. There are three main reasons why the other 107 applications did not compile.
First of all, not all applications were properly ported from TinyOS 1.x to TinyOS 2.x; therefore,
some applications have compile-time errors [78]. Second of all, the TelosB motes only have 48kb of
flash memory; therefore, if the application was bigger than 48kb then an error occurred. Third, not
all applications were built for the TelosB mote; therefore, a few of them were solely meant for MICA
motes. With that being said, the password sample size of 93 applications showed promising results
for future password predictions.

4.3.3

Password Pattern Algorithm

The following section proposes the algorithm used to predict future passwords and reduce brute
force times for the MSP430-BSL password. The 93 passwords obtained from the generate-pwds.sh
script were used to create the password pattern algorithm. Before proposing our algorithm it is important to first discuss how the 32-bytes password is identical to the IVT. The dump-pwd.py script
outputs a copy of the data stored at address 0xFFE0 to 0xFFFF. The 32 bytes copied from the the
address range is the MSP430-BSL password or IVT. The following 32 bytes dumped correspond to
the TinyOS Blink application.
0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xe2m 0x43 0x7c 0x49 0x5e 0x49 0xe2 0x43
0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xe2 0x43 0xc0 0x49 0xa2 0x49 0xe2 0x43 0x00 0x40
The 32-bytes map to the 16 interrupts found in the IVT of the MSP430 chips. With that being said,
the 32-bytes can be broken down into sixteen 2-bytes blocks. The values in each block corresponds
to the address of the Interrupt Service Routine (ISR). The values must be translate to little endian
to obtain the corresponding memory address. Table 4.2 shows the conversion of the 32-bytes to the
corresponding IVT entry for the Blink TinyOS application. As we can see from Table 4.2, 11 out of
16 IVT entries are duplicates. These entries are duplicates because they point to the same address in
memory. The IVT entries point to the same address in memory because those interrupts are unused.
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Applications that have unused interrupts have lower brute force times because the password size is
12-bytes (6 IVT entries, 2-bytes each) or 96-bits. The password size of 96-bits is still not practical
and not all applications have 11 unused interrupts.

Interrupt Flag

Address

Priority

Value

WDTIFG, KEYV

0xFFFE

15

0x4000

NMIIFG, OFIFG, ACCVIFG

0xFFFC

14

0x43e2

TBCCR0 CCIFG

0xFFFA

13

0x49a2

TBCCR1 to TBCCR6 CCIFGs, TBIFG

0xFFF8

12

0x49c0

CAIFG

0xFFF6

11

0x43e2

WDTIFG

0xFFF4

10

0x43e2

URXIFG0

0xFFF2

9

0x43e2

UTXIFG0 I2CIFG

0xFFF0

8

0x43e2

ADC12IFG

0xFFEE

7

0x43e2

TACCR0 CCIFG

0xFFEC

6

0x495e

TACCR1 and TACCR2 CCIFGs, TAIFG

0xFFEA

5

0x497c

P1IFG.0 to P1IFG.7

0xFFE8

4

0x43e2

URXIFG1

0xFFE6

3

0x43e2

UTXIFG1

0xFFE4

2

0x43e2

P2IFG.0 to P2IFG.7

0xFFE2

1

0x43e2

DAC12 0IFG, DMA2IFG

0xFFE0

0

0x43e2

Table 4.2: A sample of the IVT for the Blink application

For example, the PPPSniffer application provided by TinyOS had less unused interrupts compared to the Blink application. Table 4.3 shows the IVT values for the PPPSniffer TinyOS application. As we can see from Table 4.3, 7 out of 16 IVT entries are unused , which shortens the password
brute force size to 20-bytes (10 IVT entries, 2-bytes each), or 160 bits.
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Interrupt Flag

Address

Priority

Value

WDTIFG, KEYV

0xFFFE

15

0x4000

NMIIFG, OFIFG, ACCVIFG

0xFFFC

14

0x4680

TBCCR0 CCIFG

0xFFFA

13

0x71d0

TBCCR1 to TBCCR6 CCIFGs, TBIFG

0xFFF8

12

0x71ee

CAIFG

0xFFF6

11

0x4680

WDTIFG

0xFFF4

10

0x4680

URXIFG0

0xFFF2

9

0x73c8

UTXIFG0 I2CIFG

0xFFF0

8

0x743a

ADC12IFG

0xFFEE

7

0x4680

TACCR0 CCIFG

0xFFEC

6

0x714e

TACCR1 and TACCR2 CCIFGs, TAIFG

0xFFEA

5

0x7168

P1IFG.0 to P1IFG.7

0xFFE8

4

0x7214

URXIFG1

0xFFE6

3

0x4680

UTXIFG1

0xFFE4

2

0x4680

P2IFG.0 to P2IFG.7

0xFFE2

1

0x7316

DAC12 0IFG, DMA2IFG

0xFFE0

0

0x4680

Table 4.3: A sample of the IVT for the PPPSniffer application
With that being said, it was important to test whether there was a correlation between the
number of unused interrupts and the code size of the application. One would assume the bigger
the application the more likely interrupts would be used. We wrote a script to convert the 32-bytes
passwords to their corresponding IVT entries (little endian) for each application. Due to the size of
the password sample, the table with all the IVT entries was not added to the Appendix A; however,
the results along with the convert-endianess.py script can be access through our Github project
[75]. Using the results from the convert-endianess.py script, we wrote a python script that iterated
through all the applications and determined the number of unused interrupts for each application.
Furthermore, an additional bash script (get-apps-size.sh) was implemented to iterate through all
the TinyOS applications and obtain the code size of each application. Table A.4 shows the results
of the scripts in descending order (from largest to smallest) for code size. The results show us the
assumption made was incorrect and there was no correlation between code size and the number of
unused interrupts. For instance, /apps/TCPEcho application was 35-kB in size and had 7 unused
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interrupts, where as the /apps/tests/storage/block application was 9-kB is size and had the same
number of unused interrupts. The relation between the code size of an application to the number
of unused interrupts was not coherent and suggests that interrupts are only used if the application
specifically makes use of the interrupt. Applications that have unused interrupts point to an address
in memory with the following instruction:
address: br #0x4321
...
0x4321: reti
The designated memory address simply executes the RETI instruction to end an interrupt service
routine; hence, the reason why we see IVT entry duplicates regardless of the code size. The next
step was to determine exactly how many applications have N number of unused interrupts. Table 4.4
shows the number of applications that have either eleven, ten, nine, seven, six, five or four unused
interrupts. We will reference Table 4.4 later on in this section to help explain the password pattern
algorithm used to reduce brute force times for the MSP430-BSL password.
Table 4.4: The number of unused interrupts with the number of applications
Unused Interrupts
Eleven
Ten
Nine
Seven
Six
Five
Four
Total Applications

Applications
13
3
9
47
2
12
7
93

Even though the unused interrupts shortens the key space it is still not practical to brute force
without determining patterns found in the IVT entries. To obtain more intel about the IVT entries,
we implemented our password pattern algorithm using python. Our password pattern algorithm
consists of first sorting the addresses found in each IVT entry and second taking the differences
between the sorted addresses. Since the values stored in each IVT entry point to an ISR address
then the output of the sort-order.py script is the ISR addresses in ascending order. The python script
also provided the corresponding IVT entry position to assist in maintaining the order of the IVT
entries. Keeping track of the IVT entries order is very important since the order of the interrupts
matters when reconstructing the password. The rest of this section will discuss how the sorted
IVT entry values were used to our advantage to reduce the brute force time of the MSP430-BSL
password.
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First, sorting the addresses found in the IVT entries showed us which interrupts were most
commonly unused in our applications. Figure 4.4 shows the interrupts that were unused in our
applications sample. The IVT entry 15 always points to the start of the program (0x4000); thus, it
will always be the same for all applications. The IVT entries 0, 10, 11 and 14 were never used by the
applications we analyzed (refer to Figure 4.5). The IVT entries 5, 6, 12, and 13 were always used by
applications we analyzed and corresponded to the Timer B and Timer A interrupt handlers. The
results make sense since TinyOS is an event-driven operating system that relies heavily on triggers
such as timers[79].

Figure 4.4: The number of unused IVT entries for our application sample size.

Figure 4.5: Patterns found when sorting the IVT entries.
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Second, using the sorted addresses of the IVT entries we analyzed the differences between two
consecutive addresses. We implemented a python script (IVT-Entry-Diff.py) that iterated through
all the sorted addresses in the IVT for each application and took differences between the addresses.
The results of the script showed significant consistency between applications when evaluating the
differences between IVT entry values. The consistency between addresses found in the IVT entries
allowed use to significantly decrease the brute force time of the MSP430-BSL password.

4.3.4

Brute Forcing Using Password Prediction

Before evaluating the consistent differences between addresses found in the IVT entries we must
point out that the order of the IVT entires matter. Since the positions of the IVT entries changed
after sorting, the order of the new sorted IVT entry positions are important when reconstructing the
IVT or password. To demonstrate our theory of reducing the brute force time for the MSP430-BSL
password we provide experiment results of 3 different categories of unused interrupts. The categories
are 7 unused interrupts (Category 1), 11 unused interrupts (Category 2) and 5 unused interrupts
(Category 3).

Experiment 1
Experiment 1 consisted of applications that had 7 unused interrupts and the applications sample
size is 47 applications. Most of the applications of our sample fell within Category 1; therefore,
having a more promising brute force success. The results of the IVT-Entry-Diff.py script showed
us a consistency difference between addresses found in the IVT entries of applications that have 7
unused interrupts . Figure 4.6 shows an example of the differences between the sorted addresses
found in the IVT entries of 10 applications. For example, for App42 (/apps/tests/TestAM), the
value stored in IVT entry 15 (p15) is 0x4000 and the value stored in IVT entry 0 (p0) is 0x450E
then the difference between p0 and p15 is 0x50E (1294). We also see that the IVT entries p0, p10,
p11, p14, p7, p3, and p2 are the IVT entry duplicates (unused interrupts) because the difference
between these values will always be 0.
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Figure 4.6: The patterns found when taking the difference between two consecutive sorted address
found in the IVT entries

To predict the value stored in IVT entry 0 as well as all the other unused interrupts, we evaluated
the differences found between entry 0 and entry 15 with all the 47 applications. Figure 4.7 shows
results of taking the difference between entry 0 and entry 15. As we can see from the results, the
difference between the address stored in entry 0 and the address stored in entry 15 (0x4000) will
always fall within the range of 1,000 (0x3E8) to 2,000 (0x7D0). Therefore, to predict the address
in IVT entry 0 we must brute force all possible even numbers between 0x43E8 and 0x47D0. Since
the address had to be an even number we had 500 possible combinations to try when brute forcing
values for IVT entries p0, p10, p11, p14, p7, p3, and p2.
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Figure 4.7: The patterns found when taking the difference between IVT entry 0 and entry 15

The next value that is not a duplicate in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 6 and
IVT entry 2. Figure 4.7 shows the results of taking the difference between entry 6 and entry 2. As we
can see from the results the difference between the address stored in entry 6 and the address stored
in entry 2 will always fall within the range of 5,000 (0x1388) to 30,000 (0x7530). Furthermore, we
can see the difference between the p6 to p2 decrease from application 1 to 47 that is because the
applications were sorted from largest to smallest in code size. Therefore, since all but one application
that have 7 unused interrupts are roughly 10kB in size (reference Table A.4), then it is safe to say
the smallest application with 7 unused interrupts would be 9kB in size. We can further define the
range to brute force the value in IVT entry 6 from 7,000 (0x1B58) to 29,000 (0x7148). Since the
address had to be an even number we had 11,000 possible combinations to try when brute forcing
values for IVT entry 6.
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Figure 4.8: The patterns found when taking the difference between IVT entry 6 and entry 2

The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 5 and IVT entry 6. In Figure
4.9 the point blue shows results of taking the difference between entry 5 and entry 6. As we can see
from the results, the difference between the address stored in entry 5 and the address stored in entry
6 will always be 30 (0x1E). Therefore, we would only have to add 30 (0x1E) to the address stored
in the IVT entry 6 in order to obtain the address in IVT entry 5. We had 1 possible combination to
try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 5. The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between
IVT entry 13 and IVT entry 5. In Figure 4.9 point red shows results of taking the difference between
entry 13 and entry 5. As we can see from the results, the difference between the address stored in
entry 13 and the address stored in entry 5 will always be 38 (0x26). Therefore, we would only have
to add 38 (0x26) to the address stored in the IVT entry 5 in order to obtain the address in IVT
entry 13. We had 1 possible combination to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry position 13.
The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 12 and IVT entry 13. In Figure 4.9
point green shows results of taking the difference between entry 12 and entry 13. As we can see from
the results, the difference between the address stored in entry 12 and the address stored in entry 13
will always be 30 (0x1E). Therefore, we would only have to add 30 (0x1E) to the address stored in
the IVT entry 13 in order to obtain the address in IVT entry 12. We had 1 possible combination
to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry position 12. The next value in Figure 4.6 is the
difference between IVT entry 4 and IVT entry 12. In Figure 4.9 point purple shows results of taking
the difference between entry 4 and entry 12. As we can see from the results, the difference between
the address stored in entry 4 and the address stored in entry 12 will always be 38 (0x26). Therefore,
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we would only have to add 38 (0x26) to the address stored in the IVT entry 12 in order to obtain
the address in IVT entry 12. We had 1 possible combination to try when brute forcing values for
IVT entry 4.

Figure 4.9: The patterns found when taking the difference between the next four values of IVTs

The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 1 and IVT entry 4. Figure 4.10
shows results of taking the difference between entry 1 and entry 4. As we can see from the results,
the difference between the address stored in entry 1 and the address stored in entry 4 will always
fall within the range of 240 (0xF0) to 265 (0x109). Therefore, we would only have to add between
240 (0xF0) and 265 (0x109) to the address stored in the IVT entry 4 in order to obtain the address
in IVT entry 1. Since the address had to be a even number we had 12 possible combinations to try
when brute forcing values for IVT entry 4.
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Figure 4.10: The patterns found when taking the difference between IVT entry 1 and entry 4

The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 9 and IVT entry 1. Figure 4.11
shows results of taking the difference between entry 9 and entry 1. As we can see from the results,
the difference between the address stored in entry 9 and the address stored in entry 1 will always be
either 174 (0xAE) or 178 (0xB2). Therefore, we would only have to add either 174 (0xAE) or 178
(0xB2) to the address stored in the IVT entry 1 in order to obtain the address in IVT entry 9. We
had 2 possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 9.

Figure 4.11: The patterns found when taking the difference between IVT entry 9 and entry 1
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The next value in Figure 4.6 is the difference between IVT entry 8 and IVT entry 9. Figure 4.12
shows results of taking the difference between entry 8 and entry 9. As we can see from the results,
the difference between the address stored in entry 8 and the address stored in entry 9 will always be
either 62 (0x3E) or 92 (0x5C). Therefore, we would only have to add either 62 (0x3E) or 92 (0x5C)
to the address stored in the IVT entry 9 in order to obtain the address in IVT entry 8. We had 2
possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 8.

Figure 4.12: The patterns found when taking the difference between IVT entry 8 and entry 9

The analysis results show us that the key space for applications that had 7 unused interrupts
would roughly be 264,000,000 (4.2) possibilities. Using the baud rate of 38400, a total of 2,280
passwords can be brute forced in 1 minute (refer to Figure 4.3). With that being said, to brute force
the MSP430-BSL password with applications that had 7 unused interrupts it would take 80 (4.3)
days.
500 × 11000 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 12 × 2 × 2
(((264000000 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24)

or
or

264, 000, 000
80

(4.2)
(4.3)

Experiment 2
Experiment 2 consisted of applications that had 11 unused interrupts and the application sample
size used was 13 applications. The results of the IVT-Entry-Diff.py script showed us a consistent
difference between addresses found in the IVT entries of applications that had 11 hlunused interrupts.
Figure 4.13 shows the results of differences found between the sorted addresses of 13 applications.
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We can see see that the IVT entries p0, p10, p11, p14, p7, p3, p2, p1, p8, p9 and p4 are the unused
interrupts because the difference between these values are always 0. Using the same approach used
in Experiment 1, we evaluated the differences between addresses found in the IVT entry where there
were spikes because of a significant difference. The differences found between the address stored in
position 0 and the address stored in position 15 (0x4000) will fall within the range of 100 (0x64)
to 1,500 (0x5DC). Since the address had to be an even number we had 750 possible combinations
to try when brute forcing values for IVT entries p0, p10, p11, p14, p7, p3, p2, p1, p8, p9 and p4.
Next, the differences found between the address stored in IVT Entry position 6 and the address
stored in IVT Entry position 4 will fall within the range of 200 (0xC8) to 9,000 (0x2328). Since
the address had to be an even number then we have 4400 possible combinations to try when brute
forcing values for IVT entry position 6. Next the differences found between the address stored in
IVT entry 5 and the address stored in IVT entry 6 will either be 158 (0x9E) or 30 (0x1E). We had 2
possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 5. Next, the differences found
between the address stored in IVT entry 13 and the address stored in IVT entry 5 will always be 38
(0x26). We had 1 possible combination to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 13. Next, the
differences found between the address stored in IVT entry 12 and the address stored in IVT entry
13 will always be 30 (0x1E). We had 1 possible combination to try when brute forcing values for
IVT entry 12. The analysis results show us that the key space for applications that had 11 unused
interrupts would roughly be 6,600,000 (4.4) possibilities. With that being said, to brute force the
MSP430-BSL password with applications that have 11 unused interrupts it would take 2 (4.5) days.

750 × 4400 × 2 × 1 × 1

or

(((6600000 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24)

6, 600, 000

or

2

(4.4)

(4.5)
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Figure 4.13: The patterns found when taking the difference between two consecutive sorted address
found in the IVT entries

Experiment 3
Experiment 3 consisted of applications that had 5 unused interrupts and the application sample
size used was 12 applications. The results of the IVT-Entry-Diff.py script showed us a consistent
difference between addresses found in the IVT entries of applications that had 5 unused interrupts
. Figure 4.14 shows the results of differences between the sorted addresses found in the IVT entries
of 12 applications. We can see see that the IVT entries p0, p10, p11, p14, and p7 are the unused
interrupts because the difference between these values are always 0. Using the same approach used in
Experiment 1 and 2, we evaluated the differences between addresses found in the IVT entries where
there were spikes due to a significant difference. The differences found between the address stored
in entry 0 and the address stored in entry 15 (0x4000) will fall within the range of 1,000 (0x3E8)
to 2,000 (0x7D0). Since the address had to be an even number we had 500 possible combinations
to try when brute forcing values for IVT entries p0, p10, p11, p14, and p7. Next, the differences
found between the address stored in IVT entry 6 and the address stored in IVT entry 7 will fall
within the range of 10,000 (0x2710) to 30,000 (0x7530). Since the address had to be an even number
we had 10,000 possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 6. Next, the
address found in IVT entry 5 will always be 30 (0x1E), the IVT entry 13 will always be 38 (0x26),
and the IVT entry 12 will always be 30 (0x1E0). Therefore, all three IVT entries had 1 possible
combination to try when brute forcing for IVT entries 5, 13, and 12. Next, the differences found
between the address stored in IVT entry 4 and the address stored in IVT entry 12 will either be 42

59

(0x2A) or 38 (0x26). We had 2 possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry
4. Next, the differences found between the address stored in IVT entry 1 and the address stored in
IVT entry 4 will either be 242 (0xF2), 244 (0xF4), 248 (0xF8) or 256 (0x104). We had 4 possible
combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 1. Next, the differences found between
the address stored in IVT entry 9 and the address stored in IVT entry 1 will either be 174 (0xAE)
or 178 (0xB2). We had 2 possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 9.
Next, the differences found between the address stored in IVT entry 8 and the address stored in IVT
entry 9 will always be 92 (0x5C) or 256 (0x100). We had 2 possible combinations to try when brute
forcing values for IVT entry 8. Next, the differences found between the address stored in IVT entry
3 and the address stored in IVT entry 8 will always be 174 (0xAE) or 34 (0x22). We had 2 possible
combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 3. Next, the differences found between
the address stored in IVT entry 2 and the address stored in IVT entry 3 will always be 134 (0x86)
or 92 (0x5C). We had 2 possible combinations to try when brute forcing values for IVT entry 2.
The analysis results show us that the key space for applications that had 5 unused interrupts would
roughly be 640,000,000 (4.6) possibilities. With that being said, to brute force the MSP430-BSL
password with applications that have 5 unused interrupts it would take 194 (4.7) days.

500 × 10000 × 2 × 4 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2

(((640000000 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24)

or

640, 000, 000

or

194

(4.6)

(4.7)
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Figure 4.14: The patterns found when taking the difference between two consecutive sorted address
found in the IVT entries

Our samples prove that the time estimates made by Becher et al.

[27] of 128 years and

Goodspeed[59] of 32 years to brute force the MSP430-BSL password can be decreased to a matter
of days. Keep in mind that if our application’s sample sizes were in the thousands instead of 93
applications then we would be able to further decrease the brute force times to a matter of hours.
Furthermore, a bigger sample size can be useful in determining patterns in applications that make
use of various interrupts. Although our application’s sample was small, there was a variety of interrupts used as well as a variety of unused interrupts. With our sample size we were able to find
significant patterns between various applications, which allowed us to to reduce the brute for times.
Even if the brute force times takes couple days, brute forcing using our approach is still practical by
simultaneously brute forcing multiple capture motes. Making use of more motes is plausible because
End Devices in a WSN will most likely have the same application stored in flash memory. The only
difference found would be the sensor ID or any cryptographic keys used with the sensor node. Since
the MSP430-BSL passwords are only affected by using specific interrupts then identical passwords
will be found in similar applications. Therefore, since most of the applications in our sample fall in
the category of 7 unused interrupts then capturing 10 motes would decrease the brute force time to
roughly 8 (4.8) days. Brute forcing in 8 days is more practical than brute forcing in 128 years or
even 32 years.
80days ÷ 10motes

or

8

(4.8)
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4.4

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we contributed investigation results of analyzing the BSL passwords used to protect
access to the MSP430 MCU. We demonstrated that the password used to restrict BSL access is
identical to the IVT values. We highlighted that the address range used to store the password is
the same as the address range used to store the IVT values. Using TinyOS sample applications, we
generated a password sample size of 93 to evaluate any patterns found between applications. We
found significant patterns between passwords by sorting the addresses found in the IVT and taking
the differences between addresses. Using the results from the applications we analyzed we lowered
the brute force time from years to only days. We proof the brute force time for applications with
11 unused interrupts to be 2 days. To brute force the applications that have 7 unused interrupts it
would take 80 days and for applications that have 5 unused interrupts it would take 194 days.
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Chapter 5
Reverse Engineering MSP430 Applications

In this chapter we demonstrate the process of reverse engineering MSP430 applications found in flash
memory. As shown in Table 4.1, having the password gives anyone access to all the commands that
can be used with the MSP430. An attacker who knows the password will most likely be interested
in the commands that allow the exchange of information between a computer and the MSP430. In
particular, the attacker will be interested in the ”Transmit Data Block” command to allow a computer to extract binary data found in MSP430 flash memory [26]. Dumping MSP430 applications
found in flash memory will allow an attacker to either make copies of the binary or reverse engineer
the binary. For example, an attacker may be interested in making copies of proprietary applications
found in flash memory for redistribution purposes. More importantly, an attacker is going to be
interested in finding important information about a WSN application by reverse engineering the
sensor applications. For example, an attacker would be interested in reverse engineering our STMS
application to obtain a copy of the cryptographic keys. We prove that the asymmetric cryptography
proposals [44][45][19][20][46][42][48][49] are broken through reverse engineering. For all these proposals the private keys are pre-deployed on the sensor device; therefore obtaining a copy of the keys
allows attackers to authenticate themselves to the WSN. Reverse engineering MSP430 applications
will also allow the attacker to understand the functionality of the system and ultimately use the
captured node as an entry point to the bigger targets [5]. In most cases the central unit will be the
base station of a WSN that is most likely plugged in to a computer or server. With that being said,
the purpose of Chapter 5 is to provide an example of how an attacker can reverse engineer MSP430
applications and obtain critical information about a WSN. First, we will discuss the characteristics
of the MSP430 flash memory and provide instructions on how to dump MSP430 applications found
in flash memory. We captured one of our End-Devices from the L1-Secure STMS to demonstrate
the process of reverse engineering to obtain a copy of the network wide shared key.
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5.1

Flash Memory Dump

Understanding the memory layout of the MSP430 flash memory is an important step before dumping
MSP430 applications and reverse engineering. Figure 5.1 shows the flash memory for the MSP430.
For our purposes we will concentrate on the MSP430-F161x 48kB since that is the MSP430 version
used with our TelosB mote. However, other MSP430 versions are very similar with the only difference being the starting address of memory regions. The flash memory is partitioned into 512-byte
segments and it is the smallest size of flash memory that can be erased [76]. The flash memory
is broken down into 3 regions: information memory, RAM and main memory. There is no difference in the operations of main memory and information memory besides segment size and physical
address[60]. The information memory region consists of two segments: A and B, both 128-bytes
in size. The main memory region consist of 95 segments starting at Segment 0 and going up to
Segment 94; each segment is 512-bytes in size. The RAM region starts at address 0x1100 and it is
10,239 bytes in size. Flash memory grows downward; therefore, Segment 0 starts at address 0xFFFF
and ends at address 0xFE00. Segment 1 starts at address 0xFDFF and ends at address 0xFC00
and so on until Segment 94, which starts at address 0x41FF and ends at address 0x4000. The main
memory starts at address 0x4000 and ends at address 0xFFFF. Since user code (the application) is
stored in main memory then dumping data found within the main memory region is of our interest.

Figure 5.1: The layout of the MSP430-F161x flash memory
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Before discussing details on dumping MSP430 applications found in flash memory, we need to
discuss exactly how a TinyOS application is flashed into main memory. Figure 5.2 shows the fourphase process of flashing a TinyOS application into MSP430 flash memory. The first phase compiles
the source code (TinyOS application) using the nescc compiler and outputs a native C version of
the application. The second phase compiles the native C application using the gcc compiler and
outputs an ELF object file. The third phase converts the ELF object file to an IHEX object file using
the msp430-objcopy command. The fourth, and final, phase flashes the binary to flash memory by
reading the ASCII Text representation of the binary using the tos-bsl bootstrap loader software.

Figure 5.2: The process of flashing a TinyOS application to the MSP430 flash memory

We created a modified version of the tos-bsl to fit our specific memory dump needs. Our modified
version allows a user to pass as a parameter the file that contains the password obtained during the
brute force process. The original tos-bsl requires the main.ihex file to be passed as the password file
because the main.ihex file contains a copy of the password or the IVT. The IVT values are the last 32
bytes of the main.ihex file which are sent to the MSP430 to allow full access to the chip. Our dumpbinary.py script took four parameters: the USB port, the password file, the start address, and the
size in bytes to dump from flash memory. For example, since we used a TelosB mote equipped with a
MSP430-F1611, the start address would be 0x4000 and the dump size would be 0xF F F F − 0x4000
or 0xBFFF. The output of the script was stored in a file called app-bin, which contained the binary
that was found in flash memory of the capture mote. We used our dump-binary.py script to dump
the binary found in our ”capture mote”, which has a copy of the L1-Secure End-Device application.
The app-bin file contained the MSP430 applications that was found in the L1-Secure End-Device
mote and will be used to demonstrate the reverse engineering process.

5.2

Disassemble and Code Analysis Process

The two tools that are the most useful for reverse engineering MSP430 applications are msp430objcopy and msp430-objdump. The msp430 tools was installed when the MSP430 Tool Chain was
installed. One additional tool that could be useful is the msp430static which can be downloaded
from the msp430static source forge website[80]. The subsection below will demonstrate the process of
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converting the dumped MSP430 application , disassembling the MSP430 application , and analyzing
the assembly instructions. Regardless of the application found in a mote, the disassembly process
will apply to all MSP430 applications and the only difference between the readers dumped MSP430
application and our dumped MSP430 application will be the code analysis of the application itself.

5.2.1

msp430-objcopy

Assuming the reader has used our script to dump the MSP430 application , the following section
will describe the conversion process of the dumped MSP430 application. The app-bin file generated
by the dump-binary.py script contains binary data that is used by the MSP430 to execute the sensor
application. Before disassembling the binary we converted the binary in app-bin file to an ELF
format using the msp430-objcopy command. The msp430-objcopy allows to copy and translate
content from a source object file to a destination object file in a format different than (or the same
as) the source object file. The supported targets for the msp430-objcopy are: elf32-msp430, elf32little, elf32-big, srec, symbolsrec, verilog, tekhex, binary, and ihex. We were interested in converting
from a binary object file to an elf32-msp430 object file. The desired conversation was performed by
executing the following command:
$msp430-objcopy -I binary -O elf32-msp430 –set-start 0x4000 app-bin app-elf-msp430
The –set-start flag allowed us to specify the start address of where the converted program began.
Setting the start address to 0x4000 eased the reverse engineering process because it maintained the
default start address of main memory. Note that not all dumped MSP430 binaries support setting
the start address and unfortunately for us that was the case. However, we wrote a python script that
converts the addresses to the corresponding MSP430 main memory address, which will be discussed
in the following section.

5.2.2

msp430-objdump & msp430static

The following section will describe the process to disassemble the dumped MSP430 application found
in a mote. The msp430-objdump displayed information about MSP430 object files, such as the disassembled contents of all sections in a object file. We used the following command to disassemble
the app-elf-msp430 object file created during the conversation process.
$msp430-obdump -D app-elf-msp430 > app-disassemble.txt
After executing the msp430-objdump command, the app-disassemble.txt contained the disassembled version of the MSP430 application that was found in flash memory. In our case the appdisassemble.txt file contained assembly instructions of the L1-Secure End-Device application. At
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this point, one can start analyzing the assembly instructions to ultimately collect important characteristics of the application. However, before diving into the code analysis phase we must point
out two characteristics we found that hold true for all MSP430 applications. The first characteristic
found was an address conversion problem when converting the dump binary to an ELF format using
msp430-objcopy. The MSP430 applications do not support the –set-start flag option to set the start
address to 0x4000 instead of a dumped start address of 0x0. Since opcodes are dumped as is, the
disassembly instructions will reference an address as it is stored in flash memory. For example, the
code found at address 0x4020 in flash memory is not the same as the code found at address 0x4020
in the disassemble dumped version. The equivalent code will instead be stored at address 0x20
in the disassemble dumped version. We were able to fix this problem by implementing a python
script (convert-addr.py) that converted the address of each instruction in the app-disassemble.txt
file to the corresponding main memory address by adding 0x4000. The second characteristic found
was the use of stripping to optimize binary code size. Reducing code size by stripping makes the
reverse engineering process more difficult because useful information, such as symbols, no longer
existed. We must also point out that stripping the symbols in a binary also prevented us from using
the msp430static tool, which could have significantly sped up the reverse engineering process. In
case the reader does encounter a situation where the binary is not stripped then it is important
to highlight how the msp430static can be useful. The msp430static is a disassembly analysis tool
for working with MSP430 application images and can be downloaded from the msp430static source
forge website[80]. The msp430static uses Perl to load the disassembled version of a binary into a
SQLite3 database, and through macros or ”non-parameterized queries” one can quickly filter certain
characteristics of the disassembled binary. The msp430static relies heavily on symbols to be able to
organize the database for the disassembled version of the binary[81]. The disassembly analysis can
be sped up by using macros to quickly display all the TinyOS functions that have been used with
an application or even display blocks of instructions that are of interest. Lastly, we must also point
out that the main.exe file generated during the compile process was not stripped (refer to Figure
5.2); therefore, this file can be used with the msp430static for practice purposes.

5.2.3

Code Analysis

Up to this point, the reverse engineering process of dumping MSP430 applications and disassembling
dumped MSP430 applications has been the same regardless of the application. However, the code
analysis process will vary depending on the functionalities of the application. Since the foundation
of our L1-Secure STMS implementation solely used the physical layer, then any future application
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making use of the CC2420 inline encryption will most likely have a similar code analysis process. Furthermore, research suggests WSNs are moving towards encryption using hardware implementation
due to being 42 times faster and using 4.5 times less energy than similar software implementation
running on the MSP430 MCU[7]. With that being said, we provide the reader with an overview of
the MSP430 assembly language and contribute an example on how we were able to efficiently find
the network wide shared key of our L1-Secure STMS application.
The MSP430 interconnects a 16-bit RISC Microprocessor (MPU), peripherals, and memory
through the use of a memory address bus (MAB) and memory data bus (MDB). Figure 5.3 shows
the functional block diagram of the MSP430-F161x MCU. The von-Neumann architecture has one
address space shared with flash memory, RAM, peripherals and special function registers[60]. Words
are used to address instructions and, as mentioned in Chapter 4, words are only located at even
addresses. As a Reduce Instruction Set Computer (RISC), the MSP430 only has 15 registers, 7
addressing modes and a total of 27 instructions. Table 5.1 shows all 15 registers, where registers 4
through 15 are general-purpose registers[60]. The PC/R0 program counter register is used to point
to the next instruction be executed. The SP/R1 stack pointer register is used by the MCU to store
the return address of calls or interrupts. The SR/CG1/R2 status register is used as a source and
destination register or as a constant generator register. The CG2/R3 is a constant generator register
that generates six commonly used constants without requiring an additional 16-bit word of program
code.

Figure 5.3: The functional block diagram for the MSP430-F161x MCU

68

Table 5.1: The 15 registers supported by the MSP430.
Purpose
Program Counter
Stack Pointer
Status Register
Constant Generator
General-Purpose Registers

Register
PC/R0
SP/R1
SR/CG1/R2
CG2/R3
R4-R15

Table 5.2 shows the 7 addressing modes supported by the MSP430 MCU (examples can be found
in the MSP430x1xx Family User’s Guide manual[60]). Essentially, the addressing modes dictate
the 7 different ways that the operands of an instruction should be identified. The most common
addressing modes that are encountered by MSP430 assembly instructions are the register mode,
absolute mode, and the immediate mode.
Table 5.2: The 7 addressing modes supported by the MSP430
Addressing Mode
Register Mode
Indexed Mode
Symbolic Mode
Absolute Mode
Indirect Register Mode
Indirect Auto-Increment
Immediate Mode

Syntax
Rn
X(Rn)
ADDR
&ADDR
@Rn
@Rn+
#N

The MPS430 instruction set is composed of 27 core instructions and 24 emulated instructions.
Table 5.3 shows all 51 instructions with the emulated instructions marked with the † symbol[60]. The
difference between the two types of instructions is that the core instructions have unique op-codes,
where as emulated instructions do not have unique opcodes. The emulated instructions are used
for making assembly code more readable/writable and are replaced automatically by the assembler
with an equivalent core instruction. All instructions in Table 5.3 that have one or more operands are
word instructions used to access word data or word peripherals. Only the instructions marked with
(.B) support byte instructions used to access byte data or byte peripherals. The columns labeled
with V, N, Z, and C represent the status bit columns. The overflow bit (V) is set when the results
of an arithmetic instructions overflows the signed-variable range. The negative bit (N) is set when
the result of a byte or word instruction is negative. The zero bit (Z) is set when the result of a byte
of work instruction is zero. The carry bit (C) is set when the result of a byte or work instructions
produces a carry. The instructions will either affect the status bit (*), not affect the status bit (-),
clear the status bit (0) or set the status bit (1).
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Table 5.3: The instruction set of the MSP430.
Instruction
ADC(.B)† dst
ADD(.B) src,dst
ADDC(.B) src,dst
AND(.B) src,dst
BIC(.B) src,dst
BIS(.B) src,dst
BIT(.B) src,dst
BR† dst
CALL dst
CLR(.B)† dst
CLRC†
CLRN†
CLRZ†
CMP(.B) src,dst
DADC(.B)† dst
DADD(.B) src,dst
DEC(.B)† dst
DECD(.B)† dst
DINT†
EINT†
INC(.B)† dst
INCD(.B)† dst
INV(.B)† dst
JC/JHS label
JEQ/JZ label
JGE label
JL label
JMP label
JN label
JNC/JLO label
JNE/JNZ label
MOV(.B) src,dst
NOP†
POP(.B)† dst
PUSH(.B) src
RET†
RETI
RLA(.B)† dst
RLC(.B)† dst
RRA(.B) dst
RRC(.B) dst
SBC(.B)† dst
SETC†
SETN†
SETZ†
SUB(.B) src,dst
SUBC(.B) src,dst
SWPB dst
SXT dst
TST(.B)†
XOR(.B) src,dst

Operation
dst + C → dst
src + dst → dst
src + dst + C → dst
src ∧ dst → dst
¬src ∧ dst → dst
src ∨ dst → dst
src ∧ dst
dst → P C
P C + 2 → stack, dst → P C
0 → dst
0→C
0→N
0→Z
dst − src
dst + C → dst(decimally)
src + dst + C → dst(decimally)
dst − 1 → dst
dst − 2 → dst
0 → GIE
1 → GIE
dst + 1 → dst
dst + 2 → dst
¬dst → dst
Jump if C set / Jump if higher or same
Jump if equal / Jump if Z set
Jump if greater or equal
Jump if less
Jump unconditionally
Jump if N set
Jump if C not set / Jump if lower
Jump if not equal / Jump if Z not set
src → dst
No operation
@SP → dst, SP + 2 → SP
SP − 2 → SP, src → @SP
@SP → P C, SP + 2 → SP
Return from interrupt
Rotate left arithmetically
Rotate left through C
Rotate right arithmetically
Rotate right through C
dst + 0xF F F F + C → dst
1→C
1→N
1→C
dst + ¬src + 1 → dst
dst + ¬src + C → dst
Swap bytes
Extend sign
dst + 0xF F F F + 1
src ⊕ dst → dst

V
*
*
*
0
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
0
0
*

N
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
*
*
*

Z
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
*
*
*

C
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
*
1
*
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In this chapter, we contribute to the WSN community with a first ever example of how an
attacker can obtain cryptographic keys from a capture mote through reverse engineering. We have
analyzed the disassembled version of the binary that was dumped from the captured End-Device
mote that is part of L1-Secure system. All End-Devices that are part of the L1-Secure STMS have
a copy of the network wide shared key. If a network wide shared key has been pre-deployed then
the security of any WSN environment will be broken through reverse engineering. With that being
said, let us now discuss the technical details of how a cryptographic key can be obtained from an
application that is using encryption at the physical layer.
In Chapter 4, we discussed how the power-up/reset interrupt handler always points to address
0x4000 for its interrupt service routine. The reason this address holds true for all applications is
because the starting address of all MSP430 applications is 0x4000. Furthermore, the 0x4000 address
is also the starting address of main memory or ”user code”. Therefore, the reverse engineering
process will begin at address 0x4000 and execution flow will continue from this address. We have
grouped the instructions into blocks as multiple instructions achieve one overall function. First, the
instruction blocks along with a description of each instruction is presented. The preceding paragraph
describes the overall function and its importance. Since our contribution is to investigate how an
”attacker” can obtain a copy of the cryptographic keys, only the instructions that lead to finding
the keys will be highlighted.
Address
4000:
4004:
4008:

Op-codes
55 42 20 01
35 d0 08 5a
82 45 06 13

Instruction
mov.b &0x0120, r5
bis #23048, r5
mov r5, &0x1306

Description
;Watchdog-timer.byte (0x00) → r5
;0x5a08 ∨ r5 → r5
;0x5a08 → &0x1306

The first block of instructions are used to establish watchdog timer peripheral support and are
found in every application. The instructions at address 0x4000 moves the low byte found in the
watchdog timer register (WDTCTL). The watchdog timer peripheral is protected from direct access
by a user code and only the WDTCTL register (0x120) can be used to get access to the watchdog
timer peripheral. The instruction reads the lower byte of WDTCTL register, which at start up
has the default value of 0x6900. The instruction at address 0x4004 performs a 0x5a08 OR 0x0000
operation resulting in the value 0x5a08 to be stored in register r15. Lastly, the instruction at address
0x4008 moves the value in register r5 (0x5a08) to the address 0x1306 located in the RAM region.
The purpose of the first block of instructions is to initiate the watchdog timer peripheral support in
order to perform or prevent application restarts. All applications are required to start the watchdog
time support in order for any application to properly function.
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Address
400c:

Op-codes
31 40 00 39

Instruction
mov #14592, r1

Description
;0x3900 → r1

The second block of instructions are used to initiate the stack pointer by moving the immediate
value 0x3900 to register r1. The stack pointer is initiated to address 0x3900 which points to the top
of the RAM region in flash memory (refer to Figure 5.1).
Address
4010:
4014:
4016:
4018:
401c:
401e:
4020:
4024:
4026:

Op-codes
3f 40 48 00
0f 93
08 24
92 42 06 13
20 01
2f 83
9f 4f a6 7c
00 11
f8 23

Instruction
mov #72, r15
tst r15
jz $+18
mov &0x1306, &0x0120
decd r15
mov 31910(r15),4352(r15)
jnz $-14

Description
;0x0048 → r15
;r15 + 0xF F F F + 1
;Jump to 0x4028 if Z is set
;&0x1306 → &0x120
;Part of previous instruction
;r15 − 2 → r15
;0x7ca6(r15) → 0x1100(r15)
;Part of previous instruction
;Jump to 0x4018 if Z not set

The third block of instructions are used to copy the content from the .data section into the RAM
region. The instruction at address 0x4010 moves the immediate value 0x48 to register r15. The
register r15 is used as an offset to copy data from the main memory region to the RAM region. The
instructions at address 0x4014 and 0x4016 check to see if the value in register r15 is 0x0 and if it is
jumps to address 0x4028. We know the value in register r15 is 0x48; therefore, the program counter
or register r0 points to address 0x4018 after executing the TST and JZ instructions. The only
time the TST and JZ instructions will hold true is if the .data section of the binary is empty. The
instruction at address 0x4018 moves the value at address 0x1306 to the WDTCTL register (0x120).
From the first block of instructions we know the value stored at address 0x1306 is 0x5a08; therefore,
the value stored in WDCCTL register is 0x5a08. To interpret the value 0x5a08 of the WDCCTL
register requires splitting the word into two bytes: the high byte (0x5a) and low byte (0x08). The
high byte is used to send the write password 0x5a to watchdog timer peripheral in order to grant
access to indirect access to the user code. The low byte specifies the type of action requested to
the watchdog timer peripheral by the user code. Each bit of the low byte represent a watchdog
timer mode that is set when the byte is written to the watchdog timer peripheral. In this particular
case, the watchdog timer is set to the WDTCNTCL mode which clears the reset counter value to 0
to prevent the application to reset. The next instructions at address 0x401e decrements the value
stored in register r15 by two bytes; therefore, the new value in register r15 is 0x46. The instruction
at address 0x4020 is the most important instruction of the third block because the instruction is
copying the data found at address 0x7ca6(offset) to address 0x1100(offset). The last instruction at

72

address 0x4026 jumps to address 0x4018 if the zero bit is not set. The the zero bit will be set by
the DECD instruction once the value in register r15 has reached zero. In summary, the instructions
at address 0x4018 to 0x4026 are a loop that will copy the data found in the main memory region to
the RAM region. Figure 5.4 shows what the instructions in the loop are essentially accomplishing.

Figure 5.4: An example of how main memory data is copied into RAM.

Up to this point, we know that there was a chunk of data in main memory that was copied
to the address range of 0x1100 to 0x1148. The address of 0x1100 is the starting address of RAM;
therefore, we know that the chunk of data was copied to the first 72 (0x48) bytes of the RAM region.
Investigating the data copied to RAM was of our interest because our ultimate goal was to obtain
a copy of the cryptographic keys. Unlike registers that are ”variables” internal to the MCU, all
variables used in an application are stored in RAM at start-up time[82]. Since it is a good coding
practice to use variables to hold data, then all applications that use encryption will most likely have
a variable that will be initialized to the cryptographic key. With that being said, as seen in Figure
5.5, we used our dump-binary.py script to dump the data that was copied to RAM.

Figure 5.5: The output of dumping the data that was copied to RAM during the third block of
instructions.

The 72 copied bytes found at the beginning of the RAM region match the original 72-bytes
found in main memory from address 0x7ca6 to 0x7cef. From the 72-bytes that were dumped from
the starting application of RAM we were not 100% sure which bytes were the cryptographic key
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bytes. However, without having to continue the tedious disassembly analysis, an attacker may be
able to take shortcuts to verify which of the 72-bytes are the cryptographic bytes. In Chapter 3,
we demonstrated how a mote can be used to capture packets over a WSN. Using the PPPSniffer
results we were aware that the application was using only the physical layer IEEE802.15.4 protocol;
therefore, highly suggesting that hardware encryption was used. Since we know that the TelosB
capture more uses the CC2420 radio chip, which has a built inline AES-128 encryption, then we
know the key size has to be 128-bits or 16-bytes. Therefore, our final goal was to conclude what 16
consecutive bytes of the 72-bytes found in memory was the cryptographic key.
We know that the user code in memory referenced bytes found at address range 0x1100 to 0x1148
in RAM. Since time is of essence to an attacker, we used the cat and grep linux commands to find
instructions that made references to addresses found in the range of 0x1100 to 0x1148. Figure 5.6
shows six instructions that reference the bytes at locations 0x111b, 0x1118, 0x1144, 0x110b, 0x1108
and 0x1130. Since registers are a word in size then the instructions that move 2 bytes from RAM to
registers was not of our interest; therefore, we ignored 0x111b, 0x1118, 0x1144, 0x110b, and 0x1108
RAM address. We were left with only one valid instruction that moved the immediate value 4400
(0x1130) to address 0x1154. Therefore, the address 0x1154 pointed to the beginning of the cryptographic key, which was located at address 0x1130. Figure 5.7 shows the 16-bytes of the cryptographic
key or the network wide shared key used with the L1-Secure system. There is high possibility that
the private keys for the [44][45][19][20][46][42][48][49] proposals are also stored in RAM. Furthermore,
we are more confident that the symmetric keys for the [11][14][10][13][15][12][16][42][17][7][8][18] proposals are stored in RAM.

Figure 5.6: The addresses of all the instruction that reference the RAM region (0x11##).
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Figure 5.7: The network wide shared key found through reverse engineering.

5.3

Chapter Summary

In summary, we have contributed to the WSN community with a step-by-step process of reverse
engineering MSP430 applications found in a capture sensor nodes. In particular, we investigated the
process of dumping MSP430 applications found in flash memory as well as converting the dumped
binary to a format that can be reverse engineered using a Linux machine. The results collected
during our investigations provide the WSN community with detailed characteristics of binaries found
in MSP430 flash memory. In addition, we investigated the difficulty of reverse engineering MSP430
applications to obtain a copy of cryptographic keys found in a capture node. We have presented the
reader with a point of reference guide to assist in future MSP430 application disassembly processes.
To our knowledge, our reverse engineering example is the first of its kind that demonstrates the
feasibility of obtaining cryptographic keys from a secure WSN. Chapter 5 can serve as a starting
point to future papers that concentrate in the reverse engineering MSP430 applications .
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Chapter 6
Protecting MPS430 Firmware With Secure-BSL

In this chapter, we contribute to the WSN community with a better approach in protecting firmware
found in MSP430 flash memory. Our approach supports two levels of security. The first security
level consists of one-factor authentication in order to grant full access to the MPS430. The second
security level consists of two-factor authentication in order to grant full access to the MSP430. The
two levels of security have been implemented on top of the original bootstrap loader software and
our new Secure-BSL software is available to the WSN community through our Github project. This
chapter first discusses how the original BSL code works then goes into discussing the security design
of our Secure-BSL software and the implementation of the Secure-BSL.

6.1

Original-BSL Code

As stated in Chapter 4, the BSL code allows users or developers to communicate with the MSP430
through a USB interface. Once the TelosB mote is plugged into a USB port, a python script (tosbsl.py) is used to communicate with the MSP430 chip. The python script uses the serial python
library in order to establish and support communication between the computer and the MSP430 chip.
Furthermore, to support USB serial communication the MSP430 chip stores BSL code to respond
to any commands sent by the computer. The BSL code is stored in a secure location (0x0C00 0x0FEF) that is write protected to avoid any bypass techniques if the password is unknown. Figure
6.1 shows a diagram of the BSL commands that are supported by the MSP430. The commands in
green represent the commands that are allowed without the MSP430-BSL passwords.

Figure 6.1: The BSL commands supported by the MSP430 without the password.
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Figure 6.2 shows a diagram of the BSL commands that are supported once the correct MSP430BSL password is provided. As you can see from the diagram, full access (all the commands) are
supported by the MSP430 once the correct MSP430-BSL password is provided. Therefore, if an
attacker does not know the correct MSP430-BSL password then they will not have full access to the
MSP430 chip.

Figure 6.2: The BSL commands supported by the MSP430 with the correct password.

6.2

Secure-BSL Design

As we discussed in Chapter 4, the problem of the current MSP430-BSL password lies in the fact
that it is not random. We proved that in the best case scenario the MSP430-BSL password can
be brute forced in two days. More importantly, we have lowered the brute force time to a matter
of days rather than years. Also, we have proved that the MSP430-BSL password is predictable
because of the IVT entries not being random. In particular, we have seen a correlation between the
number of unused interrupts and the brute force time (refer to Chapter 4). With that being said,
the MSP430-BSL password is strong if and only if the brute force times are impractical.
One approach that we considered but did not pursue was the use of hash functions to take the
hash of the main.ihex file and use the results as the MSP430-BSL password. Since flashing already
requires a binary as an input to the bootstrap loader software then one would assume that hashing
would be a plausible solution. For example, if we took the SHA256 of a MSP430 binary and used the
256-bit (32 bytes) hash values as the password (IVT values) then the password would be random.
Each byte of a binary would influence the output of the SHA256 hash function and would be a
unique random password per application. Meaning, if the same binary was flashed into multiple
motes then all the motes that have the same binary have the same password. Although this is a
quick and efficient solution, taking the hash of a binary and using the hash value as the password
does not work with the MSP430 MCU. The problem with using the hashing approach is the fact that
the MSP430 MCU uses the address range of the IVT as the address space to store the password.
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The address space of the IVT and the address space for the password is the same; therefore, storing
the hash value on the IVT address space makes the mote malfunction. Modifying the IVT to use
random values prevent the application to properly start because the IVT does not have the actual
addresses of the ISRs. For example, the Power-Up interrupt needs to know where the start address
of the application is, which is 0x4000, and if the value at this interrupt is random 0x1234 then the
sensor application will never properly start. Future MCU should designate an address space to solely
store the BSL password if hashing is to be used as the password. Hashing the binary to use as the
MSP430-BSL password is not a good solution; therefore, a different approach was required.
The approach we implemented allowed us to randomize the password and still maintain proper
functionality of the interrupt handlers. Our Secure-BSL implementation is similar to the one presented by Becher et al. [27], where the IVT was randomized without affecting the overall functionality
of the IVT. The first level of security consists of randomizing the values stored in the IVT address
space and used branch instructions to maintain proper functionality of MSP430 applications. The
Secure-BSL varies from Bechers’ solution because we contributed a second level of security by using
two-factor authentication to restrict further access to the MSP430. The second level of security
consists of using a user defined password to encrypt the password file generated by the first level of
security. The rest of the this section discusses the design approach of the Secure-BSL software.

6.2.1

Security Level One

The first security level of the Secure-BSL software improved the MSP430-BSL password by randomizing the values stored in the IVT. Similar to the original bootstrap loader software (tos-bsl) the
Secure-BSL takes as input the main.ihex or the sensor application to flash. Figure 6.3 shows the
input and output of the Secure-BSL software using the security level of one. What varies from the
Secure-BSL compared to the original tos-bsl is the output generated by the Secure-BSL. The output
of the Secure-BSL is a password file to be used for future access to the MSP430 MCU after flashing.
Where as the original tos-bsl software did not output a password file since the actual main.ihex
file has a copy of the IVT values or the MSP430-BSL password. Since the Secure-BSL software
generated random IVT values it must output the new IVT values that are independent of the IVT
values found in main.ihex file. Note if the password file generated by the Secure-BSL is lost then
future access to the MSP430 is no longer supported. In order to regain control of the MSP430 then
the MCU must be mass erased and reset to factory settings.
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Figure 6.3: Input and output of the Secure-BSL one-factor security level.

Inside the Secure-BSL, it allows the IVT to be randomized and maintain proper functionality of
the MSP430 application. The design of the Secure-BSL using security level one consists of two main
components: the Unused Address List Generator and the Random Secure Password Generator.
Figure 6.4 shows the process of using the main.ihex file to generate the random IVT values and
output to a password file. The Unused Address List Generator component generates a list of unused
addresses based on the size of the firmware to be flashed. The Random Secure Password Generator
generates random IVT entries to be used as new IVT values, thus producing a random MSP430-BSL
password.

Figure 6.4: The high level components of the Secure-BSL security level one.

The purpose of the Unused Address List Generator is to generate all possible addresses that can
be used as new IVT values, or in other words new ISR addresses. In order to generate a list of
unused address the Secure-BSL calculates the range of addresses that are not used based on the
size of the binary found in the main.ihex file. For example, on average the size of a MSP430 binary
is 15,840 (0x3DE0) bytes in size (refer to Table A.4). Since main memory on the MSP430 starts
at address 0x4000, the average application ends at the address 0x3DE0 + 0x4000 or 0x7DE0. We
know that the IVT begins at address 0xFFE0; therefore, the range of unused addresses are from
0x7DE0 to 0xFFE0. Figure 6.5 shows the memory layout of the former example. The end address
is the same for all MSP430 applications; however, the start address varies depending on the size of
the binary being flashed into the MSP430 flash memory.
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Figure 6.5: A sample of how MSP430 flash memory looks like after flashing firmware.

Once the unused addresses range is calculated, the Unused Address List Generator creates a list
of all possible ISR addresses to be used as new random IVT entries. Figure 6.6 shows a flow chart of
the Unused Address List Generator design. First, the generator creates an empty list (addr-list) that
holds all the possible ISR addresses to be used with the second component of the Secure-BSL security
level one. Next, the generator iterates beginning at the start address of the unused memory space
and terminates at the end address of the unused memory space. Each iteration appends the current
start address value to the end of the addr-list and increments the start address by 4. The start
address is incremented by four because each possible ISR address has to be able to store 4-bytes of
op-codes. Using our previous example, the first address appended to the addr-list was 0x7DE0, the
second address appended was 0x7DE0 + 0x4 or 0x7DE4, the third address appended was 0x7DE8
and so on. Addresses have to be skipped by 4-bytes because the 4-bytes are used to store the
branch instruction op-codes to prevent the MSP430 application from malfunctioning. The design
approach of using the unused address space allows the Secure-BSL software to add randomness to
the MSP430-BSL password. The unused memory space makes it possible to maintain information
about the ISR by storing interrupt handler addresses in the unused space. Therefore, randomizing
the IVT address space did not affect the functionality of the sensor application because the original
values stored on the IVT were saved at a different addresses.
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Figure 6.6: The flow chart describes the process of generating a list of possible passwords (IVT
values).

The second component and last phase of the Secure-BSL was generating a random password
using the Random Secure Password Generator. Figure 6.7 shows a flow chart of the Random Secure
Password Generator design. The password generator uses the output of the Unused Address List
Generator (addr-list) as a pool of word values that can be used as new interrupt handler addresses.
Since the IVT consists of 16 words then the Get IVT Entries operation generates a list (ISR-list)
that holds all 16 original ISRs found in the IVT of the main.ihex file. The generator iterates through
each item in the ISR-list to create a new interrupt handler by randomly choosing an address from
the addr-list. The detailed process of creating a randomly chosen interrupt handler address and
maintaining the original ISR address consists of five phases. The first phase creates the op-codes
to branch to the original ISR address in order to maintain information about the original IVT. The
second phase shuffles the items in the addr-list in order to create a new random interrupt handler
address. The third phase pops the last item of the shuffled addr-list to use as the new interrupt
handler address. The fourth phase uses the op-codes generated in the first phase and programs the
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op-codes to the new interrupt handler address. The fifth and final phase is to update the IVT to
use the new interrupt handler address, which creates a random IVT (password).

Figure 6.7: The flow chart describes the process of generating a secure random password (IVT
values).

The security level one of the Secure-BSL made it possible to increase the brute force times of
the MSP430-BSL password and better protect the MSP430 MCU. Furthermore, our design assures
the overall security of a WSN by decreasing the likelihood of each sensor node having the same
password. The use of a randomization methodology increases brute force times for each sensor node
that has a MSP430 chip. Even if the binary is the same size, the generated password will most likely
be unique using our Secure-BSL software. With that being said, the security level one increases the
brute force times for each mote on a WSN, even if the motes have the same MSP430 application in
flash memory. To get full access to a flashed MSP430 mote users will be required to have a copy of
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the password file that was generated when the mote was originally programmed. Figure 6.3 shows
how the password file is generated when using the security level one.

6.2.2

Security Level Two

The second security level of the Secure-BSL software further protects the MSP430 MCU by encrypting the password file generated by the security level one. In other words, the security level two is
built on top of the security level one in order to provide a two-factor authentication when attempting
to gain full access to the MSP430 MCU. Figure 6.8 shows the input required by the main.ihex file as
well as a user defined passphrase. The output is an encrypted version of the password file generated
by the security level one.

Figure 6.8: Input and output for the Secure-BSL two-factor security level

Figure 6.9 shows the three components of the Secure-BSL security level two feature. The functionality of the first two components are identical to the previously discussed security level one
design. Unlike security level one, the security level two adds an additional operation that encrypts
the password file that is used for future MSP430 MCU access. The AES-256 Encryption operation
encrypts the password file using a user defined passphrase. The additional encryption operations
allows the support of a two-factor authentication to grant full access to the MSP430 MCU.

Figure 6.9: The high level components of the Secure-BSL two-factor security level

Figure 6.10 shows the process of gaining full access to a MSP430 MCU using security level two.
The AES-256 Decryption operation takes the user defined password and the encrypted password file
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as input and outputs of the decrypted version of the password file. The decrypted data will be sent
to the MSP430 MCU to check if the correct password has been sent by the user in order to grant full
access. The two-factor authentication adds an additional security to the MSP430 by only allowing
users that have the password file and the passphrase to gain full access to the MSP430 MCU.

Figure 6.10: The high level execution flow when dumping data from flash memory using two-factor
security level

Although the MSP430 Programming with BSL Manual is wrong by stating that ”access to the
MSP430 memory through the BSL is protected against misuse by a user-defined password”[26]. We
have been able to contribute to the MSP430 family with functional features of allowing users to
specify a password to protect flash memory. Our contribution of adding a two-factor authentication
strengthens the security of the MSP430 by requiring the user to enter two forms of authentication
in order to have full access to the MCU. Even if an attacker is able to gain a copy of the password
file they will not be able to gain full access to the MSP430 MCU without knowing the passphrase
to decrypt the file. Using AES-256 makes it harder for the attacker to brute force the passphrase in
order to obtain the values stored in the password file.

6.3

Secure-BSL Implementation

The implementation of our Secure-BSL software is built on top of the original bootstrap loader
(tos-bsl) software. Figure 6.11 shows the UML diagram of the Secure-BSL with the yellow boxes
representing our contributions. The UML diagram only displays the components of the Secure-BSL
that are responsible for flashing firmware and extracting firmware. However, the complete SecureBSL source code can be found in our Github project[75]. The Secure-BSL software has six classes,
each of which contribute a unique operation to the program. First, the main class is responsible for
collecting user parameters and initiating proper bootstrap loader functionality based on user input.
The Memory class is responsible for preparing data to be flashed into memory by parsing binary data
into segments. The Segment class provides the segment structure to represent flash memory and it
is used by the Memory class. The AES256 class is responsible for providing the security level two
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functionality. The BootStrapLoader class is a core component of the Secure-BSL as it provides the
operations to interact/communicate with the MSP430 bootstrap loader. Lastly, the LowLevel class
is responsible for exchanging information between the MSP430 MCU and the computer running the
Secure-BSL software. The rest of this chapter discusses in detail the implementation of the two main
operations supported by the Secure-BSL: flashing firmware and extracting firmware. In particular,
we highlight how our implementation assures the security of firmware through the use of our two
levels of security.

Figure 6.11: The UML diagram of the important components of the Secure-BSL software
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Before discussing in detail our implementation, we must first highlight how the Secure-BSL works
when flashing firmware into the MSP430 MCU. Figure 6.15 shows the flags used when flashing
firmware into the MSP430 MCU. Below are the descriptions of each flag used with the Secure-BSL
software when flashing firmware into the MSP430 MCU.
• –telosb: specifies that the sensor device connected is a TeloB mote.
• -c: specifies the port number where the TelosB mote is connected (e.g.

/dev/ttyUSB0,

/dev/ttyUSB1)
• -r: reset the TelosB mote
• -e: mass erase data found in TelosB flash memory
• -l: specifies the Intel Hex file type of the program
• -p: specifies the program to flash
Using the –telosb flag sets the appropriate settings, such as baud rate speeds before initiating
any BootStrapLoader operations. The -c sets the connection port to the USB port where the TelosB
mote is plugged in. The -r flag forces the TelosB to reset after the firmware has been flashed. The
-e erases all data found in the TelosB mote; in other words, the -e flag erases all segments found in
the MSP430 flash memory. The -I lets the program know that the binary to flash is in a ASCII text
representation. The -p specifies the file that contains the binary of the sensor application to flash
into the MSP430 flash memory.
Refer to the UML diagram for any clarifications as we explain the process of how flashing firmware
works. The main class collects all the flags specified by a user when running the Secure-BSL software.
The flags are used to set the appropriate setting before initiating communication with the mote, or
in our case the MSP430 MCU. Essentially, the Secure-BSL is composed of two core components:
the BootStrapLoader class and the Memory class. The BootStrapLoader class is responsible for
exchanging information between the computer and the MSP430 using commands. For example, the
txPasswd command is used to the check the password before granting full access to the MSP430
MCU. If the password is correct then other commands are granted, such as the actionProgram,
programData or uploadData. The actionProgram command flashes data stored in a list of segments
to the MSP430 main memory. The programData command allows the user to write N number of
bytes to the flash memory without the need to re-flash the whole MCU. The uploadData command
allows the user to extract data from firmware and is triggered if the -u flag and -s flag are used. Figure
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6.17 shows that the -u flag specifies the start address in flash memory and the -s flag specifies the
number of bytes to extract from flash memory. Other interesting commands that are supported prior
to providing the password are the actionMassErase and the actionReset. These two commands do not
allow you to extract firmware found in flash memory because the actionReset command will just reset
the mote and the actionMassErase will erase all the data in the mote. The actionMassErase will also
erase the password (IVT values) and set it to the default of 16 0xFF values. The BootStrapLoader
class inherits the LowLevel class since the LowLevel class has the operations of communicating
directly with the mote. The LowLevel class uses the python serial library to communicate directly
with the MSP430 MCU. To exchange information between the MSP430 and the computer the serial
library is used to read and write frames between the two devices. For example, to send data from
the computer to the MSP430 MCU a frame is created with the DATA FRAME (0x70) stored in
the header section. Or if data is sent from the MSP430 to the computer, the frame will have
the DATA ACK command in the header section. There are various commands that are supported
by the MSP430 that we do not list because the purpose of this chapter is to explain our SecureBSL implementation. With that being said, let us now discuss our implementation, which was
implemented on top of the second core components of the Secure-BSL, the Memory class.
As we can see from the UML diagram there are two components highlighted in yellow that were
added to the original tos-bsl in order to implement our Secure-BSL software. The first component
was added to the Memory class to implement the first security level of the Secure-BSL. The second
component was added as an additional class used by the Memory class to implement the second level
of security. First, we discuss the security level one implementation and then conclude by discussing
the security level two implementation.

6.3.1

Security Level One Implementation

As previously stated, the Memory class was responsible for parsing the binary found in the main.ihex
file into segments. Using -I flag with the Secure-BSL software sets the file type to ihex and invoked
the loadIHex operation from the Memory class. The loadIHex operation was responsible for reading
the data in the main.ihex file and parsing the data into a list of segments. All bytes found in the
main.ihex file were transferred into the list of segments except for the IVT bytes. The loadIHex
operation used the generateRandomIVT operation to generate random IVT values before adding
the IVT bytes into the list of segments. The generateRandomIVT operation was responsible for
generating new interrupt handler addresses, saving the old ISR, and updating the IVT values.
To generate new interrupt handler addresses at random ,the generateRandomIVT operation used
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the generateAddrList operation and the popRandomAddr operation. To update the IVT values,
the generateRandomIVT operation used the securePassword operation. The pseudo code for the
generateRandomIVT operation is as follows:
generateAddrList()
Create empty list newIVT
FOR eachItem IN oldIVT
Create branch opcodes 30 40 eachItem
newISR = popRandomAddress()
Append opcodes newISR: 30 40 eachItem
Append newISR to newIVT list
updateNewPassword(newIVT)
The newIVT list held the new IVT values that were selected at random from the list of the unused
address. The opcodes 30 40 represented the branch instruction op codes for the MSP430 instruction
set. A branch instruction was created for every entry on the old IVT and a randomly selected unused
address was picked as the new IVT entry. The list of segments was updated accordingly and the
new randomly chosen interrupt handler address was added to the new IVT.
The generateAddrList operation was responsible for generating a list of unused address that could
be used as a new interrupt handler address. The start of the unused address space was calculated
by adding the size of the binary with the starting address of main memory. The end of the unused
address space was always the starting address of the IVT, which was always 0xFFE0. The start
address of main memory may have varied depending on the version of the MSP430 MCU (refer to
Figure 5.1). The unused addresses that were added to the list had to be able to hold 4-bytes of data
(the branch opcodes). The pseudo code for the generateAddrList operation is as follows:
Calculate start address start = sizeOf Binary + 0x4000
FOR address IN range (start to 0xffe0, skip every 4)
Append address to Unused-Address-list
After the list of unused addresses were generated, the popRandomAddr operation allowed to randomly pop one on the list. Therefore, the popRandomAddr always returned an unused address at
random, and by removing the item from the list we avoided using the same address for two different
interrupt handlers. The pseudo code for the popRandomAddr operation is as follows:
Shuffle Unused-Address-list
Pop address from Unused-Address-list
The securePassword operation is discussed in the following section because it interlinks with the

88

security level two.

6.3.2

Security Level Two Implementation

The security level two feature of the Secure-BSL is built on top of the security level one implementation. The securePassword operation implemented most of the functionality of the security level
two but also implemented part of the security level one. The responsibilities of the securePassword
operation was to add the new IVT to the list of segments and output the new IVT to the user. The
new IVT was added to the list of segments and was later flashed into the MSP430 main memory
using the BootStrapLoader class. The new IVT was also written to the password file; however, this
was where the operation varied depending on the security level. The new IVT values were written to
the password file unencrypted if the security level one was used. The new IVT values were written to
the password file encrypted if the security level two was used. The -t flag specified to the Secure-BSL
software to enable a two-factor authentication by using a user defined passphrase. The pseudo code
for the securePassword operation is as follows:
Append newPwd to list of segments
Convert newPwd to hex hexPwd
IF passphrase is used
Create AES256 object encryptPWD
Encrypt hexPwd cipherPwd = encryptPWD.encrypt(hexPwd)
Write cipherPwd to password file
ELSE
Write hexPwd to password file
The AES256 class was used to encrypt the password file using a user defined password. Figure
6.12 shows the parameters passed to the AES256 class in order to encrypt the password file. The IV
used was generated using the Random python library package, which guaranteed randomness with
the password and achieved semantic security. The password file contained either the encrypted or
decrypted version of the new IVT depending on the security level used.
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Figure 6.12: The input and output of the AES 256 encryption.

The last component of the Secure-BSL was the process of extracting binary data found in the
MSP430 flash memory. The operation to extract data from flash memory was handled by the main
class by first checking if the user had requested a memory dump. Figure 6.21 shows the flags used
to initiate a memory dump using the Secure-BSL software. The -u and -s will specified the range
of memory to extract from the MSP430 flash memory. The -P flag specifies the password file to use
which either held an encrypted or decrypted version of the IVT. The -t specified the user passphrase
to use in order to decrypt the password file before sending the IVT values to the mote. Therefore,
the main class was responsible for decrypting the password file if a user defined passphrase had been
used to encrypt the password file. The pseudo code for a memory dump operation is as follows:
IF dump firmware requested
Read password file pwdBytes
IF passphrase is used
Create AES256 object decryptPWD
Decrypt pwdBytes pwdBytes = decryptPWD.decrypt(pwdBytes)
IF decryption error occurs
THEN wrong password
FOR byte IN pwdBytes
convert byte to character
add character to password
Send password to MSP430
If the password file had not been encrypted then the values stored in the password file were converted
to characters before sending them to the MSP430. The MSP430 checked to see if the correct
password had been sent before granting full access the MCU. Figure 6.13 shows the parameters that

90

were passed to the AES256 class in order to decrypt the file.

Figure 6.13: The input and output of the AES 256 decryption.

6.4

Secure-BSL Testing

We created a Secure-BSL testing environment by creating a directory that held the main.ihex file
and the secure-bsl.py file. Figure 6.14 shows the testing environment for our Secure-BSL software.
The main.ihex file is the ASCII text representation of the binary created from the STMS L1-Secure
Coordinator application. However, any TinyOS applications can be used to obtain a main.ihex file
to be used as an example. The secure-bsl.py file is our Secure-BSL software and can be dowloaded
from our Github project[75].

Figure 6.14: The Secure-BSL testing environment consisting of the main.ihex file and secure-bsl.py
file

6.4.1

Security Level One Tests

The first test performed was to check if flashing an application to the MSP430 properly worked
when using the security level one. Figure 6.15 shows the flags used to flash firmware using our
Secure-BSL software. After programming the mote with the L1-Secure Coordinator application we
performed the same steps as discussed in Chapter 3.3 to check if the STMS L1-Secure WSN worked
properly. The results show that using the Secure-BSL software to flash firmware does not affect
the functionality of STMS. Therefore, we prove that our solution of randomizing the IVT and using
branch instructions does maintain the functionality of MSP430 application.
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Figure 6.15: An example of using the Secure-BSL security level one to flash firmware into the
MSP430

After flashing the firmware into the MSP430 MCU, the Secure-BSL software generated a password
file that contained the new IVT values or the new password. Figure 6.16 shows the content of the
password file generated by the secure-bsl.py script. The values found in the password file were
randomly generated by the Secure-BSL software and were used for future access to the MSP430
MCU.

Figure 6.16: The content found in the password file generated by the Secure-BSL software

The second test performed was to check if extracting firmware using the correct password file
properly worked. Figure 6.17 shows the parameters used to extract firmware found in flash memory
using our Secure-BSL software. The -P flag specified the password file to use, in which we provided
the correct password file that was generated during test one. The results show a successful flash
memory dump of 64-bytes starting at address 0x4000.
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Figure 6.17: An example of extracting firmware found in flash memory using the correct password
file

The third test performed was to check the security of extracting firmware using an incorrect
password file. Figure 6.18 shows the results of using the incorrect password file to extract firmware.
We specified to use the main.ihex file, which contained the original values of the IVT before they
were randomized using our Secure-BSL software. The results show that without having the correct
password file, full access to the mote was restricted even with a copy of the original main.ihex file.

Figure 6.18: An example of extracting firmware found in flash memory using the incorrect password
file

6.4.2

Security Level Two Tests

The fourth test performed was to check if flashing an application to the MSP430 properly works
when using the security level two. Figure 6.19 shows the additional flag (-t) used to flash the program
using the security level two. The -t flag allowed the developer to specify a user defined passphrase
to be used to protect the password file. Since the actual bytes flashed into the MSP430 memory
were not affected by the security level two there was no need to check if the functionality of STMS is
maintained. We have already shown from test one that the L1-Secure application properly worked
when using the Secure-BSL software.
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Figure 6.19: An example of using the Secure-BSL security level two to flash firmware into the
MSP430

Flashing firmware using security level two generated a password file that contained an encrypted
version of the new IVT values. Figure 6.20 shows the content of the password file highlighted in
white. The values found in the password file were encrypted using AES-256 and the user defined
passphrase was used as the key.

Figure 6.20: The encrypted content found in the password file generated by the Secure-BSL software

The fifth test performed was to check if extracting firmware using the correct password file and
the correct passphrase properly worked. Figure 6.21 shows the additional (-t) parameter to use to
extract firmware found in flash memory. We provided the correct encrypted password file that was
generated during test four and the correct user defined passphrase. The results show a successful
flash memory dump of 64-bytes starting at address 0x4000.
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Figure 6.21: An example of extracting firmware found in flash memory using the correct password
file and the correct passphrase

The sixth test performed was to check the security of extracting firmware using an incorrect
passphrase. Figure 6.22 shows the results of using the incorrect passphrase to decrypt the password
file. We specified to Secure-BSL software to use a different passphrase that was used to encrypt the
password file. The results show that without having the correct passphrase an attacker would not
be able to access the MSP430 MCU even after stealing a copy of the password file.

Figure 6.22: An example of extracting firmware found in flash memory using the incorrect passphrase

6.5

Chapter Summary

In summary, we have contributed to the WSN community with a working solution to the problem
of using a weak MSP430-BSL password. We investigated possible solutions to improve the MSP430BSL password used to protect firmware found in flash memory. Our results show that using the hash
of the binary breaks the overall functionality of the MSP430 application. Instead, we investigated
and used a randomization approach where the values of the IVT were replaced with random unused
addresses. The use of branch instructions to save the original IVT entries guarantees that our
solution does not break the overall functionality of an MSP430 application. We presented the reader
with our design approach in fixing the weak MSP430-BSL password and implemented a working
version by building on top of the default bootstrap loader software (tos-bsl). We tested our SecureBSL software and provided a fully functionality MSP430 bootstrap loader software to the MSP430
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family community. Chapter 6 serves as a guideline on how the Secure-BSL software works as well as
contributes proof that our Secure-BSL software truly does secure data found in the MSP430 MCU.
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Chapter 7
Results and Evaluations of Secure-BSL

In this chapter, we evaluate the security strength of the improved MSP430-BSL password generated
by our Secure-BSL software. We evaluate the memory overhead and computational overhead of
using our Secure-BSL software. Next, we prove that our Secure-BSL software provides security
enhancements in protecting the MSP430 MCU from feature mote capture attacks. More importantly
we contribute to the WSN community investigation results that analyze the strength of the improved
MSP430-BSL password. First, we investigate any patterns found in the randomized version of the
MSP430-BSL password. Second, we investigate worst case scenarios to calculate the brute force time
to break our secure MSP430-BSL password. Lastly, we investigate the security strength of using the
two-factor authentication and the likelihood of an attacker successfully accessing firmware.

7.1

Resource Overhead Evaluation

The memory overhead and computational overhead of randomizing the MSP430-BSL password is not
significant. The security enhancements obtained from using the Secure-BSL outweighs the overhead
added to the MSP430 MCU. We evaluated the memory overhead of adding additional opcodes used
to implement the branch instructions. Next we evaluated the computational over head of using the
branch instructions to maintain the original IVT functionality.
The memory overhead generated by the Secure-BSL depended on the number of interrupts found
in the IVT. We know that the MSP430 supported 16 interrupts; therefore, we used this number to
calculate the number of extra bytes added to memory. Figure 7.1 shows a sample of the extra bytes
added to main memory when flashing an application with the Secure-BSL software. The yellow
boxes show the 4-bytes opcodes used to implement the branch instructions and maintain proper
functionality of the IVT. For example, the last 2-bytes in the IVT highlighted in green show the
hex values 8a b2. The hex values correspond to the interrupt handler address 0xb28a (little endian)
found at IVT entry 15. The values found at address 0xb28a are 4-byte opcodes 30 40 00 44, which
translates to the following instruction: br 0x4000. The branch instruction found at address 0xb28a
is used to maintain proper functionality and points to the entry address of the application. With
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that being said, a total of 4-bytes are needed to maintain the original 16 ISR addresses found in the
IVT. The total memory overhead generated by the Secure-BSL is 64 (7.1) bytes. The 64 bytes of
code added a minor memory overhead to the overall MSP430 flash memory.

16

interrupts × 4

bytes

or

64

bytes

(7.1)

Figure 7.1: A sample of memory after flashing an application using secure-BSL.

To calculate the computational overhead required investigating the number of clock cycles needed
to execute the branch instruction. As discussed in Chapter 5.2, the branch instruction was an
emulated instruction that was replaced with a core instruction (refer to Table 5.3). Since a branch
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instruction is an unconditional jump to an address anywhere in memory then the emulated BR
instruction is replaced with the JMP core instruction[60]. Therefore, the number of clock cycles
required to execute the JMP instruction was the same as the number of clock cycles required to
execute the branch instruction. Using the MSP430 Users Guide manual[60] we determined that it
requires 2 clock cycles to execute a JMP instruction. With that being said, our random IVT approach
had a computation overhead of 2 clock cycles per interrupt event. For example, our random IVT
approach required an additional 2 clock cycles to handle a Power-Up interrupt and successfully
start a MSP430 application. The additional 2 clock cycles were only applied whenever an interrupt
occurred, which was less frequent than the actual user code execution. Since the MSP430, when
powered by a USB, handles 7 million clock cycles per second, an additional 2 clock cycles is a very
small computational overhead. The additional 64-bytes of code and 2 clock cycles per interrupt did
not affect the overall MSP430 application. Instead, the security posture of the MCU was enhanced
at little to no cost.

7.2

Password Strength Investigation Results

Using the same approach discussed in Chapter 4.3, we generated password samples using a modified version of the generate-pwds.sh script. The modified version used the Secure-BSL software to
generate the MSP430-BSL passwords for both the security levels (one-factor and two-factor). The
modified script and all other scripts used to analyze the Secure-BSL passwords can be downloaded
from our Github project[75]. In addition, the output of all of the scripts and any analysis not
included in Appendix B can be found in our Github project. The application’s sample size is 93
and was obtained from the TinyOS /apps directory. The covert-endianess.py script was used to
convert the 32-bytes password to the corresponding IVT entries (little endian) for each of the 93
applications. The results showed that the IVT entries generated by the Secure-BSL software were
indeed random and every IVT entry was unique. Unlike the original bootstrap loader (tos-bsl), our
Secure-BSL was able to generate unique IVT entries for every request made to flash firmware. For
instance, we saw in Figure 4.4 how the tos-bsl software had duplicates at IVT entries 0, 10, 11, and
14. Duplicate IVT entries are the results of applications not using all the interrupts supported by the
MSP430. Furthermore, we established that the Power-Up interrupt at IVT entry 15 was the same
for all 93 applications because it always points to the entry point of the application. Our Secure-BSL
approach improved the security of the MSP430-BSL password by randomizing the values stored in
these unused, or default, interrupts. Table B.1 shows results of generating random interrupt handler
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addresses for IVT entries 0, 10, 11, 14, and 15 for all 93 applications. The results show that not a
single entry in the IVT were duplicates and holds true for all other 11 interrupts not shown in Table
B.1. We only presented five of the sixteen interrupts as an example; however, the complete set of
IVT entries for all 93 applications can be found in our Github project[75]. In addition, to double
check that all of the IVT entries are unique we ran the IVT-duplicates.py script on our applications
sample. Our results, shown on Table B.2, show that not a single application has a duplicate IVT
entry. Every single IVT entry is unique for all applications; hence, we see the number 16 in the IVT
entries column.
In Chapter 4.3, we demonstrated how the MSP430-BSL password can be brute forced in a matter
of days by sorting the ISR address found in the IVT. The graph in Figure 4.5 showed how sorting the
ISR addresses produced patterns than could be used to predict future MSP430-BSL passwords. For
example, the red line in Figure 7.2 represents the pattern that is persistent between 13 applications
that have eleven unused interrupts. The pattern is based on the IVT position after sorting the ISR
address found in each IVT entry. The pattern makes the password predictable because we prove
that future applications with 11 unused interrupts have the following sorted pattern: 15, 0, 10, 11,
14, 7, 3, 1, 8, 9, 2, 4, 6, 5, 13, and 12. Unlike the tos-bsl software, our Secure-BSL software truly
enforces the security of the MSP430-BSL password by randomizing the values found in the IVT.
In this chapter, we refer to the IVT generated by the Secure-BSL as ”secure IVT” and the IVT
generated by the tos-bsl as ”original IVT”. The bars in Figure 7.2 represent the IVT positions after
sorting the interrupt handler addresses found in the secure IVT entries. The same 13 applications
that were used to collect the data for the line graph were used to collect the data for the bar graphs.
The data can be found in Table B.3; however, the graph presents a visual representation of the
randomness found in the secure IVT entries. For example, for the 13 applications examined, the
first address of the sorted interrupt handlers corresponds to the following secure IVT positions: 12,
5, 9, 0, 11, 7, 2, 1, 6, 5, 1, 13, and 15, where the first address of the sorted ISRs for all 13 applications
correspond to the original IVT entry 15. We can conclude that even if the entry address 0x4000
was always stored in IVT entry 15, our Secure-BSL software was capable of randomizing the value
stored in the secure IVT entry 15 while maintaining sensor application functionality.
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Figure 7.2: Comparing the results of the applications with 11 duplicates when using the tos-bsl vs
the Secure-BSL .

Figure 7.3: Results of the first IVT entry when sorting the IVT addresses.
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To get an in-depth analysis of the level of randomness based on brute force times we analyzed
the rest of the applications in our sample to investigate for any predictable patterns. If any patterns
were found in the sorted version of the secure IVT entries then our approach would have practical
brute force times. For all the applications in our sample we investigated the first address (lowest
address) found in the sorted version of the secure IVT entries. Figure 7.3 shows the priority level
corresponding to the lowest address found in the secure IVT of each application. The results show
that the Secure-BSL software generated true randomness because IVT entries that correspond with
the lowest addresses were unpredictable. For example, for the first ten applications the IVT entry
that corresponded to the lowest address were as follows: 1, 0, 10, 7, 11, 3, 4, 8, and 3. Unlike
the original IVT version where the entry was always 15, our Secure-BSL did not provide practical
patterns for future password predictions. For the sake of completeness, Figure 7.4 shows the priority
levels corresponding to the sorted address found in the secure IVT of each application. The numbers
around the circle represent the applications and the numbers in the inner circle represent the IVT
entry. The circle graph shows that there was not a single line that created a perfect circle, which
would indicate the IVT entry being constant between all 93 applications. We can conclude that there
was not a single indicator of patterns when using our Secure-BSL; thus, generating unpredictable
MSP430-BSL passwords.

Figure 7.4: Results of all IVT entries when sorting the IVT addresses.
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In Chapter 4.3, we demonstrated that the key to reducing the brute force time to a matter of days
lies behind the fact that there were significant patterns found by taking the difference between sorted
addresses found in the original IVT entries. Therefore, it was important to investigate whether
our secure IVT values lacked of this MSP430-BSL password security flaw. We used IVT-EntryDiff.py script to take the difference of the sorted addresses found in the secure IVT entries for each
application. Figure 7.5 shows a comparison of the MSP430-BSL password for the Blink application
using the Secure-BSL (in green) vs the tos-bsl (in red). The tos-bsl results show that taking the
difference of the sorted addresses significantly decreased the brute force time because it only required
to brute force 2 of the 16 original IVT entries. Furthermore, the possible combinations for these
2 IVT entries were in the address range of 0x4000 + 900 or 0x4380 to 0x4000 + 1500 or 0x45DC.
Where as the Secure-BSL results show that taking the difference of the sorted addresses did not
provide patterns for potential brute force time reduction. The difference between sorted addresses
for the Secure-BSL were not consistent and varied between addresses at different IVT entries. For
example, the difference between the second lowest address and the lowest address was roughly 4700
bytes. The differences between sorted addresses for the Blink application were in the range of 300
up to 8100-bytes and were random between addresses. Impractical brute for times still holds true
for the Secure-BSL approach even after taking the difference between sorted addresses found in the
secure IVT entries. The results of taking the difference between sorted addresses remain random for
all 93 applications found in our sample.

Figure 7.5: Comparison of taking the difference of the Blink application using Secure-BSL vs tos-bsl.
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Our investigation results show that the MSP430-BSL password generated by our Secure-BSL
software significantly increases brute force times. Even if an attacker is able to generate password
samples using the Secure-BSL, they are still not able to deduct a concrete pattern to use for future
password predictions. Furthermore, even if they generate password samples for the same application
they are still not able to deduct a concrete pattern because the Secure-BSL is independent of the
bytes found in a binary. Every time a new password is generated the output is always different than
the previous result. The Secure-BSL software selects a random and unused address found in main
memory. Therefore, the only factor that affects the generated password is the binary size found in
flash memory.
Since the generated MSP430-BSL password depended on the unused space found in the main
memory, we investigated the correlation between unused space and brute force time. We investigated
the worst case scenario where the unused space was big enough to implement the Securel-BSL
randomization approach. In order for our Secure-BSL approach to work, there had to be at least 64bytes (4-bytes per interrupt) of unused space available in order to maintain application functionality.
Therefore, the following assumptions can be made for our worst case scenario.
• Attacker knows the end address of the unused space: 0xFFE0 (IVT Start Address)
• Attacker knows the start address of the unused space: 0xFFA0 (0xFFE0 - 64)
• Attacker knows memory layout: Addressing space (even numbers only)
Since code access is always performed on even addresses then out of the 64-bytes we only care
about the even numbers; therefore, reducing the set of addresses to 32. The address set N looks as
follows:
N={0xFFA0, 0xFFA2, 0xFFA4, ... , 0xFFDA, 0xFFDC , 0xFFDE}
The set N has 32 items that correspond to possible addresses that could be found in the random
IVT generated by the Secure-BSL. Since there were a total of 16 interrupts in the IVT we calculated
the number of possible combinations of 16 items (addresses) from set N. We used the permutation
formula (7.2) shown below to calculate the number of possible permutations of r items from set n
where the order of the items matter.
n!
(n − r)!

(7.2)

In our worst case scenario the value for N is 32 and the value for R is 16 (7.3).
32!
(32 − 16)!

or

1.25 × 1022

(7.3)
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The total possible IVT value combinations that can be generated from a set of 32 possible
addresses is 12,576,278,705,767,096,320,000 (7.3). We know that our TelosB mote was capable of
checking 2280 passwords per second at a baud rate 38400 (refer to Figure 4.3). Therefore, to brute
force our approach of using a randomized IVT in the worst case scenario with an address space of
32 would take 1.04 × 1013 (7.4) years! We can conclude that in the worst case scenario where the
binary is (0xF F E0 − 64) − 0x4000 or 0xBFA0 (49056) bytes in size, it is not practical to brute force.
Reducing the set of addresses to 32 still does not make it practical to brute force because of the 16
interrupts addresses required in each permutation.

((((1.25 × 1022 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24) ÷ 365)

1.04 × 1013

or

(7.4)

We further examined the worst case scenario where the attacker was aware of how our implementation worked. For instance, the attacker was able to get a copy of this thesis and examined
Chapter 6 to get information on how the Secure-BSL was implemented. In particular, the attacker
was interested in knowing that the Secure-BSL used 4-bytes to store the opcodes used to maintain
the application functionality. By knowing that 4-bytes were stored at every address the attacker
could further reduce the set of addresses to 32 ÷ 2, or 16. Therefore, in the worst case scenario the
attacker had all the addresses found in the random IVT; however, the order of the addresses or the
IVT entries were unknown. The attacker would have to brute force all possible combinations of the
16 addresses that were part of the random IVT but the order was unknown. The total number of
combinations for 16 addresses is 16! or 20,922,789,888,000. With that being said, to brute force
the worst case scenario where all the addresses are known but the order is unknown it would take
17,459 (7.5) years! Our results show that even in the worst case scenario where there are only 16
addresses to combine and check it is still not practical to brute force. Adding randomization to the
MSP430-BSL password made it impossible or impractical to brute force.

((((2.09 × 1013 ÷ 2280) ÷ 60) ÷ 24) ÷ 365)

or

17459

(7.5)

We would also like to take the time to point out that data stored in memory was in little endian;
therefore, when brute forcing the addresses they must be converted to little endian. For example,
using our worst case scenario example one of the permutations is as follows:
0xFFD4, 0xFFB0, 0xFFC4, 0xFFCC, 0xFFA8, 0xFFA0, 0xFFB4, 0xFFD8,
0xFFAC, 0xFFC0, 0xFFD0, 0xFFA4, 0xFFDC, 0xFFBC, 0xFFC8, 0xFFB8
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The IVT values are converted to get the corresponding password bytes that is sent to the MSP430
to check the password. The converted IVT values that are sent to the mote looks as follows:
D4 FF B0 FF C4 FF CC FF A8 FF A0 FF B4 FF D8 FF
AC FF C0 FF D0 FF A4 FF DC FF BC FF C8 FF B8 FF
With that being said, although the password was 32-bytes, we only needed to permutate 16 addresses
since the MSP430 used the IVT address space to also store the password.
Our last evaluation consisted of examining the security strength of using the two-factor authentication. Since two-factor authentication does not protect access to the actual MSP430 MCU then
if the attacker is able to somehow brute force the MSP430-BSL password the two-factor is also
broken. However, we have demonstrated that even in the worst case scenario it would take 17,459
years to brute our secure MSP430-BSL password. The two-factor authentication protects the password file generated by the Secure-BSL. The password file generated by Secure-BSL has a copy of
the IVT values found in flash memory and is used to authenticate users for future access to the
MSP430 MCU. Without the password file, future access to the MSP430 is restricted and requires
mass erasing flash memory to regain control of the MCU. With that being said, if an attacker is able
to obtain a copy of the password file they are guaranteed full access to the MSP430 MCU. The two
factor authentication is used to encrypt the file using a user defined passphrase. The Secure-BSL
requires users to enter an 8-character long password if they decide to use the security level of two
features. With a copy of the password file, the attacker can perform an offline attack to brute the
password used to encrypt the password file. Table 7.1 shows how long it would take to brute force
the password depending on the characters used in the passphrase[79].
Table 7.1: Password cracking time for passphrase of 8 characters long.
Character Types
Numerals
Alphabet
Alphabet (Lower and Upper)
Alphabet (Lower and Upper) and Numerals
Alphabet (Lower and Upper), Numerals and Symbols

Time
10 Seconds
348 minutes
62 days
253 Days
23 Years

The calculated times are based on a dual processor PC capable of guessing 10,000,000 passwords
per second[79]. Enforcing the user to use 8-character long passwords better secures the encrypted
file; however, it is up to the user for the desired level of security. Ideally, the user should use a
password that has combinations of alphabetical letters, numerals and symbols, which would take
roughly 23 years to brute on a dual processor PC. The strength passphrase is out of our hands
because only the user will be able to dictate the level of security for the password file. Keep in mind,
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that if a user forgets the password it is equivalent to losing the password file. The user has to mass
erase the MSP430 in order to regain access to the MCU. Accessing the MSP430 MCU after flashing
could become a hassle when using two-factor; however, most of the sensor devices once deployed are
not accessed until the device itself starts malfunctioning.

7.3

Chapter Summary

In summary, we evaluated the memory overhead and computational overhead of using our SecureBSL software to protect the MSP430 MCU. Our results showed that there is only a memory overhead
of 64-bytes and a computational overhead of 2 clock cycles when an interrupt occurs. Next, we
investigated the security posture of the randomized MSP430-BSL password generated by our SecureBSL software. We examined the passwords for true randomness by checking for any patterns after
sorting the IVT addresses. Furthermore, we took the differences between addresses to check or any
consistent patterns that can be used for future password predictions. The results proved that the
MSP430-BSL password is truly random and that a unique password is guaranteed even if binaries
are the same. We continued our analysis by checking for worst case scenarios where an attacker
knows the range of addresses used to generate the new IVT values. The results show that even if
the attacker is able to lower the set of addresses to 16 it still takes 17,459 years to try all possible
permutations of 16. Lastly, we investigated the worst case scenario where an attacker is able to steal
the encrypted password file and brute force the passphrase to decrypt the file. We concluded that
as long as the user uses a strong passphrase of 8 characters long with a combination of the alphabet
(Lower and Upper), numerals and symbols it would take 23 years in a dual processor PC. Chapter
7 has demonstrated that using our Secure-BSL software truly protects future access to the MSP430
MCU.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis we have evaluated and improved the security of WSNs by contributing a secure approach
to restricting physical access to the MSP430 micro-controllers units. In Chapter 2, we discussed
background information on various research topics for WSNs. We discussed various types of sensor
applications and provided examples of related WSNs that remotely monitor the temperature of
indoor environments. We evaluated various proposed cipher protocols for WSNs and concluded that
hardware implemented ciphers are the best choice for WSNs. In addition, we mentioned various
types of key management protocols and concluded that ECC is the best choice for implementing
PKC in WSNs. We highlighted on different algorithms proposed to mitigate the leaking of secret
information when nodes are captured. Lastly, we discussed related research of node tampering
attacks and shown the possibilities of obtaining information stored the internals of MSP430.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the design, implementation and testing results of our STMS. First,
we discussed our design approach of using a star topology, where the central node is a Coordinator
and the end nodes are the End-Device’s collection of temperature levels. Our implementation allows
to encrypt the communication between the Coordinator and the End-Devices using a network wide
shared key. Furthermore, we use the AES inline encryption built in to the CC2420 RF chips of
our TelosB motes. Using the PPPSniffer application and Wireshark, we were able to confirm that
the communication within our STMS was encrypted. We used STMS as our WSN experimental
environment to evaluate the security of the network.
In Chapter 4, we discussed our approach of breaking the MSP430-BSL password in a matter
of days. We highlighted the two methods of programming the MSP430 and proposed that BSL
programming is the most effective way. We analyzed the 32-bytes (256-bit) IVT or the ”BSL
password” used to protect access to the MSP430. We evaluated password samples generated from
93 TinyOS applications to check for password patterns between applications. Our results showed
that BSL password does indeed have patterns that can be used to predict future BSL passwords.
The brute force times depends on the number of unused interrupts found in a sensor application we
analyzed. If the number of unused interrupts are 11, then the brute force time would be roughly
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2 days. If the the number of unused interrupts is 7 then the brute force time would be roughly 80
days. Using our password pattern technique we have been able to reduce the brute force time from
years to a matter of days.
In Chapter 5, we demonstrated how attackers can reverse engineer MSP430 applications found
in flash memory. We provided a step-by-step example of how an attacker can find cryptographic
keys stored in RAM. First, we presented the memory layout of the MSP430 and highlighted the
important regions in memory. We the provided instructions on how to disassemble dumped MSP430
applications by using the msp430-objcopy and the msp430-objdump tools. We provided the reader
a quick reference guide on the instruction set supported by the MSP430. Lastly, we provided
techniques that can be used effectively to reverse engineer MSP430 applications with the goal of
reducing the time to find cryptographic keys.
In Chapter 6, we contributed our solution of improving the password used to protect BSL access
to the MSP430 chips. We discussed our design of randomizing the IVT values by replacing them
with unused addresses. The randomizing of the IVT values and still maintaining functionality
of the MSP430 application was achieved by using branch instructions to save the original ISRs.
We implemented our approach on top default bootstrap loader software (tos-bsl) and made our
Secure-BSL implementation open source [75]. In addition to increasing the brute force times for
the MSP430-BSL password, our Secure-BSL software supported two factor authentication by using
a user defined passphrase. Our test results show that the brute force times for the MSP430-BSL
password is impractical.
In Chapter 7, we evaluated our Secure-BSL implementation by checking the overhead added
to the application as well as the level of security of the random generated passwords. Our results
showed that there was only a memory overhead of 64-bytes and a computational overhead of 2 clock
cycles when an interrupt occurred. The results show that in the worst case scenario, if the attacker
is able to lower the set of addresses to brute force to 16, it still takes 17,459 years to try all possible
permutations of 16. We also investigated the worst case scenario where an attacker is able to steal
the encrypted password file and brute force to decrypt the file. We concluded that as long as the
user uses a strong passphrase of 8 characters long with a combination of the alphabet (lower and
upper case), numerals and symbols it would take 23 years in a dual processor PC.
We have contributed to the WSN community with additional security investigation results. First,
this thesis provides an implemented secure temperature monitoring system that collects temperature
levels in a environment. Second, this thesis demonstrates a brute force attack on a capture node
to be practical and the password that protects access to the MSP320 MCU can be broken in a
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matter of days. Third, to our knowledge, we have provided the first example of reverse engineering
MSP430 applications to obtain copies of cryptographic keys. Fourth, we have contributed the SecureBSL software that improved the password used to protect access to the MSP430 MCU. Lastly, our
evaluation results show the significant improvements of protecting MSP430 MCU from node capture
attacks.
Future work directions focus on evaluating other popular micro-controller units to test their level
of tamper resistance. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the ARM, AVR and PIC microcontrollers [2]. We want to investigate whether any of the various micro-controllers have the same
BSL password vulnerable as well as investigate any other tampering techniques that can be used to
access the MCU internals. Lastly, we would like to increase our password sample size to thousands
or even million samples in order to find more password patterns
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Appendix A
Script Results For tos-bsl

Table A.1: Time Results of Checking The Correct MSP430-BSL Password

Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 6
Trial 7
Trial 8
Trial 9
Trial 10
Averages

1
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.07s
0.07s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s

200
12.58s
12.64s
12.91s
12.87s
12.94s
12.90s
12.88s
12.92s
12.84s
12.92s
12.84s

400
25.15s
25.30s
25.70s
25.78s
25.81s
25.77s
25.77s
25.78s
25.80s
25.79s
25.67s

600
37.80s
38.03s
38.67s
38.62s
38.67s
38.65s
38.71s
38.64s
38.53s
38.70s
38.50s

800
50.44s
51.67s
51.58s
51.54s
51.53s
51.49s
51.63s
51.35s
51.60s
51.65s
51.45s

1000
63.04s
64.45s
64.56s
64.43s
64.28s
64.48s
64.32s
64.40s
64.17s
64.39s
64.25s

Table A.2: Time Results of Checking The Incorrect MSP430-BSL Password

Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 6
Trial 7
Trial 8
Trial 9
Trial 10
Averages

1
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.07s
0.09s
0.06s
0.06s
0.06s
0.07s

200
12.58s
12.86s
12.95s
12.86s
12.86s
12.92s
12.85s
12.85s
12.79s
12.91s
12.84s

400
25.21s
25.78s
25.71s
25.86s
25.71s
25.79s
25.79s
25.72s
25.72s
25.68s
25.70s

600
37.74s
38.73s
38.60s
38.59s
38.66s
38.74s
38.54s
38.60s
38.61s
38.60s
38.54s

800
51.78s
51.55s
51.55s
51.66s
51.59s
51.65s
51.55s
51.46s
51.47s
51.43s
51.57s

1000
63.47s
64.57s
64.50s
64.45s
64.50s
64.46s
64.34s
64.47s
64.27s
64.41s
64.34s
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Table A.3: Time Results of Checking The MSP430-BSL Passwords Using a Baud Rate of 38400

Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 3
Trial 4
Trial 5
Trial 6
Trial 7
Trial 8
Trial 9
Trial 10
Averages

1
0.02s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.03s
0.02s
0.03s

200
5.18s
5.18s
5.15s
5.10s
5.11s
5.19s
5.19s
5.21s
5.22s
5.17s
5.17s

400
10.29s
10.30s
10.35s
10.35s
10.35s
10.37s
10.29s
10.36s
10.29s
10.27s
10.32s

APPS

600
15.57s
15.41s
15.45s
15.43s
15.48s
15.55s
15.53s
15.46s
15.51s
15.51s
15.49s

800
20.70s
20.56s
20.59s
20.77s
20.67s
20.74s
20.72s
20.81s
20.65s
20.59s
20.68s

1000
25.77s
25.79s
25.81s
25.93s
25.84s
25.67s
25.76s
25.84s
25.80s
25.83s
25.80s

Size (b)

IVT Entries

Duplicates

tinyos-main-apps-UDPEcho.ihex

41830

12

5

tinyos-main-apps-TCPEcho.ihex

35304

10

7

beacon-enabled-TestGTS-coordinator.ihex

30830

10

7

beacon-enabled-TestMultihop-router.ihex

29668

10

7

tests-deluge-Basestation.ihex

29070

13

4

tests-deluge-GoldenImage.ihex

28480

13

4

tests-deluge-SerialBlink.ihex

27356

13

4

apps-tests-TestNetwork.ihex

27216

13

4

tutorials-LowPowerSensing-Sampler.ihex

27034

10

7

apps-tests-TestNetworkLpl.ihex

27008

13

4

STMS-Coordinator-src.ihex

26702

12

5

STMS-Coordinator-PWD-Test-src.ihex

26460

12

5

tinyos-main-apps-MultihopOscilloscope.ihex

26324

13

4

TestMultihop-pancoord.ihex

25952

10

7

TestGTS-device.ihex

24714

10

7

TestAssociate-coordinator.ihex

24348

10

7

TestMultihop-device.ihex

24178

10

7

TestAssociate-device.ihex

24042

10

7

tests-deluge-Blink.ihex

24030

11

6

TestData-coordinator.ihex

23748

10

7

TestData-device.ihex

23520

10

7

tinyos-main-apps-MultihopOscilloscopeLqi.ihex

23426

13

4
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STMS-EndDevice-src.ihex

23204

10

7

STMS-EndDevice-PWD-Test-src.ihex

23010

10

7

beacon-enabled-TestIndirect-coordinator.ihex

22926

10

7

tkn154-nonbeacon-enabled-TestPromiscuous.ihex

22720

12

5

beacon-enabled-TestIndirect-device.ihex

22716

10

7

beacon-enabled-TestStartSync-coordinator.ihex

22156

10

7

apps-tests-TestTymo.ihex

20670

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestAssociate-device.ihex

20436

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestIndirectData-coordinator.ihex

20348

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestAssociate-coordinator.ihex

20244

10

7

beacon-enabled-TestStartSync-device.ihex

19992

10

7

apps-tests-LinkBench.ihex

19938

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestIndirectData-device.ihex

19802

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestActiveScan-device.ihex

19734

10

7

nonbeacon-enabled-TestActiveScan-coordinator.ihex

19524

10

7

tests-tkn154-packetsniffer.ihex

19418

12

5

tests-TestFtsp-FtspLpl.ihex

19106

10

7

apps-MOE-MOE-BaseStation.ihex

16796

12

5

apps-MOE-MOE-Attack replay.ihex

16748

12

5

cc2420-TestSecurity-BaseStation.ihex

16716

12

5

tutorials-LowPowerSensing-Base.ihex

16238

12

5

tinyos-main-apps-Oscilloscope.ihex

15830

11

6

apps-tutorials-PacketParrot.ihex

15024

10

7

cc2420-TestSecurity-RadioCountToLeds1.ihex

14546

10

7

tinyos-main-apps-BaseStation.ihex

14462

12

5

tutorials-RssiDemo-RssiBase.ihex

14382

12

5

tutorials-RssiDemo-InterceptBase.ihex

14350

12

5

apps-MOE-MOE-BroadCast.ihex

14312

10

7

apps-MOE-MOE-Attack inject.ihex

13842

10

7

tinyos-main-apps-PPPSniffer.ihex

13768

10

7

tests-TestFtsp-FtspLplBeaconer.ihex

12796

10

7

tests-cc2420-LplBroadcastPeriodicDelivery.ihex

12678

10

7

113

tests-cc2420-LplUnicastPeriodicDelivery.ihex

12606

10

7

apps-tests-TestLpl.ihex

12496

10

7

apps-tests-TestSrp.ihex

12248

10

7

apps-tests-RadioStress.ihex

11410

10

7

apps-tests-TestPowerManager.ihex

11400

6

11

tests-cc2420-TestAcks.ihex

11234

10

7

apps-tests-TestTimerSync.ihex

11160

10

7

tutorials-RssiDemo-SendingMote.ihex

10986

10

7

tests-storage-Config.ihex

10916

10

7

apps-tests-TestAM.ihex

10888

10

7

tests-storage-Log.ihex

10848

10

7

tests-arbiters-TestRoundRobinArbiter.ihex

10748

6

11

tests-storage-CircularLog.ihex

10648

10

7

tests-arbiters-TestFcfsArbiter.ihex

10558

6

11

tests-storage-SyncLog.ihex

10192

10

7

apps-tutorials-BlinkConfig.ihex

10142

10

7

tests-msp430-Adc12.ihex

9318

8

9

tests-storage-Block.ihex

9318

10

7

apps-tests-TestEui.ihex

9046

8

9

apps-tutorials-Printf.ihex

8602

8

9

apps-tests-TestPrintf.ihex

8584

8

9

apps-tests-TestAdc.ihex

7642

7

10

tinyos-main-apps-Sense.ihex

6988

7

10

apps-tests-TestScheduler.ihex

6314

6

11

tests-TestLed-LedColor.ihex

5770

8

9

tests-TestLed-MultiLed.ihex

5710

8

9

apps-tests-TestLocalTime.ihex

5416

8

9

tests-msp430-AdcSimple.ihex

4786

7

10

apps-tests-TestSerialPrintf.ihex

4214

8

9

apps-tutorials-SharedResourceDemo.ihex

3282

6

11

tests-telosb-TestUserButton.ihex

3020

8

9

tests-TestLed-MultiLedSingle.ihex

2622

6

11

114

tests-TestLed-BlinkLed.ihex

2582

6

11

apps-tutorials-BlinkFail.ihex

2558

6

11

tinyos-main-apps-Blink.ihex

2538

6

11

apps-tutorials-BlinkTask.ihex

2458

6

11

apps-tests-TestPowerup.ihex

1378

6

11

tinyos-main-apps-Powerup.ihex

1378

6

11

tinyos-main-apps-Null.ihex

1328

6

11

Table A.4: Correlation Between Code Size vs. Number of Duplicate IVT Entries
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Appendix B
Script Results For Secure-BSL

APPS

App Size

P0

P10

P11

P14

P15

UDPEcho.ihex

41830

0xfe0e

0xf15a

0xf792

0xefc6

0xf952

TCPEcho.ihex

35304

0xea3c

0xd764

0xfa10

0xd69c

0xd4bc

TestGTS-coordinator.ihex

30830

0xfb98

0xe558

0xee3c

0xc994

0xe4e4

TestMultihop-router.ihex

29668

0xedce

0xf316

0xd282

0xe626

0xc2b6

deluge-Basestation.ihex

29070

0xf504

0xf048

0xd720

0xfcd4

0xde08

deluge-GoldenImage.ihex

28480

0xe550

0xcd0c

0xc028

0xd9ec

0xcb28

deluge-SerialBlink.ihex

27356

0xfee2

0xf202

0xddca

0xf152

0xbe9a

TestNetwork.ihex

27216

0xae8a

0xf2d2

0xd94a

0xb846

0xde7a

LowPowerSensing-Sampler.ihex

27034

0xdc9a

0xc85e

0xb266

0xd296

0xf6da

TestNetworkLpl.ihex

27008

0xff74

0xb288

0xb1ec

0xcb94

0xaf48

IEEE802154-Coordinator.ihex

26438

0xa93c

0xd888

0xd79c

0xdc20

0xdfc4

MultihopOscilloscope.ihex

26324

0xf70a

0xf0aa

0xe15e

0xbf7e

0xf376

TestMultihop-pancoord.ihex

25952

0xf4c4

0xcde4

0xef50

0xb168

0xd750

TestGTS-device.ihex

24714

0xae26

0xd17e

0xf352

0xff6e

0xe0fe

TestAssociate-coordinator.ihex

24348

0xeae4

0xff1c

0xbbd0

0xa5a0

0xd8ec

TestMultihop-device.ihex

24178

0xeda8

0xbfbc

0xbbb0

0xf8e4

0xc6f4

TestAssociate-device.ihex

24042

0xcad2

0xe1ea

0xfb6a

0xfd96

0xc3de

deluge-Blink.ihex

24030

0xca96

0xe5ca

0xe492

0xb192

0xe46e

TestData-coordinator.ihex

23748

0xfdc4

0xc770

0xe0e8

0xf3a4

0xd96c

TestData-device.ihex

23520

0xf0e2

0xd14a

0xda96

0xa92e

0xbe16

MultihopOscilloscopeLqi.ihex

23426

0x9fda

0xeb62

0xc75e

0xa6f6

0xddf2

IEEE802154-End-Device-src.ihex

23010

0xe8b6

0xcde2

0xe54e

0xd3ba

0xc09a

TestIndirect-coordinator.ihex

22926

0xf644

0xb30c

0xccec

0xfea8

0xa0f8

tkn154-nonTestPromiscuous.ihex

22720

0xbc80

0xa770

0xa308

0xe030

0x9d04

TestIndirect-device.ihex

22716

0xaa5e

0xc262

0xa55a

0xae42

0xd692

116

TestStartSync-coordinator.ihex

22156

0xc114

0xd5a0

0x9c8c

0xe0bc

0xd068

TestTymo.ihex

20670

0xd2c6

0xc8de

0xf4f2

0x9b7a

0xf506

nonTestAssociate-device.ihex

20436

0xf382

0xc4da

0xda2e

0xe8a2

0xeaf2

nonTestIndirectData-coord.ihex

20348

0x940a

0xb916

0xe202

0xee36

0xa0ce

nonTestAssociate-coord.ihex

20244

0xaf18

0xe04c

0x9d78

0xc8d4

0xaab8

TestStartSync-device.ihex

19992

0xfa38

0x91b0

0xac68

0xb8c0

0x96bc

LinkBench.ihex

19938

0xc528

0xc4c0

0xbb24

0xd908

0xa384

nonTestIndirectDatadevice.ihex

19802

0xb5f4

0x8e28

0xfe38

0xbdc8

0xaba8

nonTestActiveScan-device.ihex

19734

0xb28a

0xa3e6

0xadfa

0xd226

0xfcfe

nonTestActiveScan-coord.ihex

19524

0x7cfc

0xfae4

0xcee8

0xac18

0xad2c

nonTestActiveScan-coord.ihex

19524

0xadca

0xc38a

0xeb5e

0xf93a

0xc9f6

tkn154-packetsniffer.ihex

19418

0xfa66

0xd12e

0x93de

0xb1d2

0xa732

TestFtsp-FtspLpl.ihex

19106

0xcce2

0x9cc6

0xde4e

0xa71e

0xf66e

L1-Secure-Coordinator-src.ihex

18958

0xf70e

0xb82e

0xa3c6

0xaece

0xf86e

MOE-MOE-BaseStation.ihex

16796

0x8cfa

0xb06a

0xa77a

0x8e12

0xc4a6

MOE-MOE-Attack replay.ihex

16748

0x893e

0xee52

0x907a

0x8c0a

0xeeaa

TestSecurity-BaseStation.ihex

16716

0x9a26

0x8ae2

0x8a36

0xc4b2

0xae46

LowPowerSensing-Base.ihex

16238

0xdfa4

0xa19c

0xa298

0x9648

0x98c8

Oscilloscope.ihex

15830

0xa964

0xbf38

0xa24c

0xa61c

0xae90

L1-Secure-End-Device-src.ihex

15492

0x8f5a

0xead2

0xe1e2

0xad5e

0xa466

PacketParrot.ihex

15024

0xae52

0x9c3e

0xe5e2

0xdaf6

0xdc5e

RadioCountToLeds1.ihex

14546

0xf8aa

0xa992

0x9fea

0xfaf6

0x94c6

BaseStation.ihex

14462

0xa572

0xbeae

0xc7f6

0x80f2

0xacc2

RssiDemo-RssiBase.ihex

14382

0x926e

0xa546

0x9f2e

0x7ebe

0xf98a

RssiDemo-InterceptBase.ihex

14350

0xd666

0xc236

0xb986

0x8a16

0x8336

MOE-MOE-BroadCast.ihex

14312

0xa842

0x7e36

0xb9f6

0xf12e

0x8af2

PPPSniffer.ihex

13768

0xcd4e

0x91fe

0xbaa6

0xa1b2

0xa0f6

FtspLplBeaconer.ihex

12796

0x9a48

0xae5c

0xb5bc

0xa240

0x8c30

BroadcastPeriodDelivery.ihex

12678

0xb060

0x9914

0xfc6c

0xb2c4

0x8394

UnicastPeriodicDelivery.ihex

12606

0x8880

0x80a4

0x881c

0x793c

0x8364

TestLpl.ihex

12496

0xf87c

0xd314

0xaae0

0x8a20

0xdcbc

TestSrp.ihex

12248

0xe374

0xb7d8

0xcba4

0xc29c

0xcc6c
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RadioStress.ihex

11410

0xeb0e

0x7bda

0x6d9e

0xc88a

0xcaea

TestPowerManager.ihex

11400

0x97f6

0xee5a

0x6f76

0xc736

0xb4c2

cc2420-TestAcks.ihex

11234

0xd04a

0xaa2e

0xdf2e

0xbfda

0x9002

TestTimerSync.ihex

11160

0xc45a

0xc432

0xa592

0x913a

0xbc1a

RssiDemo-SendingMote.ihex

10986

0xc86c

0xaa84

0xb4b4

0x71e4

0xe064

storage-Config.ihex

10916

0xa694

0xcfe4

0xe2a8

0x7e04

0xf508

TestAM.ihex

10888

0xe026

0x9526

0xc07e

0xa50e

0xd3ce

storage-Log.ihex

10848

0x8c50

0xc744

0x9efc

0x9c08

0xc7bc

TestRoundRobinArbiter.ihex

10748

0xdb7c

0xeef4

0xdab8

0x7bd4

0x6c20

storage-CircularLog.ihex

10648

0x87c0

0xf3f8

0xf8b0

0xf408

0xc4e8

arbiters-TestFcfsArbiter.ihex

10558

0xe87a

0x8e1e

0xfe2e

0xb79a

0xc3ee

storage-SyncLog.ihex

10192

0x96de

0xa656

0xd196

0xb96a

0xc2be

BlinkConfig.ihex

10142

0xb2d6

0xd422

0xb0e2

0xa556

0xaece

msp430-Adc12.ihex

9318

0xa0bc

0x6fdc

0xffdc

0x88a8

0xaae8

storage-Block.ihex

9318

0xfdcc

0xa520

0x9fac

0x9ef8

0xf8d0

TestEui.ihex

9046

0xfcda

0x8ca6

0xc866

0xa4d2

0xe482

Printf.ihex

8602

0x6f34

0x7e3c

0x7bdc

0xf370

0xbd2c

TestPrintf.ihex

8584

0xd9fa

0xfa66

0xd606

0x767a

0xd572

TestAdc.ihex

7642

0x9658

0xd650

0xa9ac

0xcfa0

0xfeac

Sense.ihex

6988

0xd93c

0x6560

0xba54

0x99b0

0x9ba0

TestScheduler.ihex

6314

0x7b82

0xb57a

0x76d6

0xdfba

0xed86

TestLed-LedColor.ihex

5770

0x82c0

0x9e90

0xa824

0xc900

0xacd4

TestLed-MultiLed.ihex

5710

0x638a

0x8c66

0xd402

0xe90a

0xcb22

TestLocalTime.ihex

5416

0xfe46

0xcb7a

0xbfa6

0x9932

0x77e6

msp430-AdcSimple.ihex

4786

0x6e34

0xaab8

0xf628

0x931c

0xbda4

TestSerialPrintf.ihex

4214

0xad34

0xa844

0xaff0

0xc29c

0xc448

SharedResourceDemo.ihex

3282

0x4eae

0x7dce

0xfc8e

0xd0aa

0x8b0a

telosb-TestUserButton.ihex

3020

0xd0dc

0xeeec

0xd900

0xefb8

0xa6a0

TestLed-MultiLedSingle.ihex

2622

0xf42e

0x7262

0xad62

0xb3fe

0x76ae

TestLed-BlinkLed.ihex

2582

0xc52e

0xf9fe

0x54e6

0x9d2a

0xe736

BlinkFail.ihex

2558

0x98b2

0xe59e

0xa806

0x949e

0x6e5e

Blink.ihex

2538

0x9a8a

0x70be

0x6672

0xa396

0x8446
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BlinkTask.ihex

2458

0xd2da

0xc6ca

0xbf62

0x95d6

0x73e6

TestPowerup.ihex

1378

0x8964

0xd178

0x91cc

0x9930

0xb718

Powerup.ihex

1378

0xacec

0xbd64

0xda80

0xa700

0xcccc

Null.ihex

1328

0x8fc6

0xb3fa

0x8f1e

0xf9ca

0x6f16

Table B.1: Sample of the values generated for IVT priority levels 0, 10, 11,14, and 15

APPS

Size (b)

IVT Entries

Duplicates

UDPEcho.ihex

41830

16

1

TCPEcho.ihex

35304

16

1

TestGTS-coordinator.ihex

30830

16

1

TestMultihop-router.ihex

29668

16

1

deluge-Basestation.ihex

29070

16

1

deluge-GoldenImage.ihex

28480

16

1

deluge-SerialBlink.ihex

27356

16

1

TestNetwork.ihex

27216

16

1

LowPowerSensing-Sampler.ihex

27034

16

1

TestNetworkLpl.ihex

27008

16

1

IEEE802154-Coordinator.ihex

26438

16

1

MultihopOscilloscope.ihex

26324

16

1

TestMultihop-pancoord.ihex

25952

16

1

TestGTS-device.ihex

24714

16

1

TestAssociate-coordinator.ihex

24348

16

1

TestMultihop-device.ihex

24178

16

1

TestAssociate-device.ihex

24042

16

1

deluge-Blink.ihex

24030

16

1

TestData-coordinator.ihex

23748

16

1

TestData-device.ihex

23520

16

1

MultihopOscilloscopeLqi.ihex

23426

16

1

IEEE802154-End-Device-src.ihex

23010

16

1

TestIndirect-coordinator.ihex

22926

16

1

tkn154-nonTestPromiscuous.ihex

22720

16

1

TestIndirect-device.ihex

22716

16

1

119

TestStartSync-coordinator.ihex

22156

16

1

TestTymo.ihex

20670

16

1

nonTestAssociate-device.ihex

20436

16

1

nonTestIndirectData-coord.ihex

20348

16

1

nonTestAssociate-coord.ihex

20244

16

1

TestStartSync-device.ihex

19992

16

1

LinkBench.ihex

19938

16

1

nonTestIndirectDatadevice.ihex

19802

16

1

nonTestActiveScan-device.ihex

19734

16

1

nonTestActiveScan-coord.ihex

19524

16

1

nonTestActiveScan-coord.ihex

19524

16

1

tkn154-packetsniffer.ihex

19418

16

1

TestFtsp-FtspLpl.ihex

19106

16

1

L1-Secure-Coordinator-src.ihex

18958

16

1

MOE-MOE-BaseStation.ihex

16796

16

1

MOE-MOE-Attack replay.ihex

16748

16

1

TestSecurity-BaseStation.ihex

16716

16

1

LowPowerSensing-Base.ihex

16238

16

1

Oscilloscope.ihex

15830

16

1

L1-Secure-End-Device-src.ihex

15492

16

1

PacketParrot.ihex

15024

16

1

RadioCountToLeds1.ihex

14546

16

1

BaseStation.ihex

14462

16

1

RssiDemo-RssiBase.ihex

14382

16

1

RssiDemo-InterceptBase.ihex

14350

16

1

MOE-MOE-BroadCast.ihex

14312

16

1

PPPSniffer.ihex

13768

16

1

FtspLplBeaconer.ihex

12796

16

1

BroadcastPeriodDelivery.ihex

12678

16

1

UnicastPeriodicDelivery.ihex

12606

16

1

TestLpl.ihex

12496

16

1

TestSrp.ihex

12248

16

1
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RadioStress.ihex

11410

16

1

TestPowerManager.ihex

11400

16

1

cc2420-TestAcks.ihex

11234

16

1

TestTimerSync.ihex

11160

16

1

RssiDemo-SendingMote.ihex

10986

16

1

storage-Config.ihex

10916

16

1

TestAM.ihex

10888

16

1

storage-Log.ihex

10848

16

1

TestRoundRobinArbiter.ihex

10748

16

1

storage-CircularLog.ihex

10648

16

1

arbiters-TestFcfsArbiter.ihex

10558

16

1

storage-SyncLog.ihex

10192

16

1

BlinkConfig.ihex

10142

16

1

msp430-Adc12.ihex

9318

16

1

storage-Block.ihex

9318

16

1

TestEui.ihex

9046

16

1

Printf.ihex

8602

16

1

TestPrintf.ihex

8584

16

1

TestAdc.ihex

7642

16

1

Sense.ihex

6988

16

1

TestScheduler.ihex

6314

16

1

TestLed-LedColor.ihex

5770

16

1

TestLed-MultiLed.ihex

5710

16

1

TestLocalTime.ihex

5416

16

1

msp430-AdcSimple.ihex

4786

16

1

TestSerialPrintf.ihex

4214

16

1

SharedResourceDemo.ihex

3282

16

1

telosb-TestUserButton.ihex

3020

16

1

TestLed-MultiLedSingle.ihex

2622

16

1

TestLed-BlinkLed.ihex

2582

16

1

BlinkFail.ihex

2558

16

1

Blink.ihex

2538

16

1
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BlinkTask.ihex

2458

16

1

TestPowerup.ihex

1378

16

1

Powerup.ihex

1378

16

1

Null.ihex

1328

16

1

Table B.2: The number of duplicates found for each application using the Secure-BSL

Pos:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

tos

15

0

10

11

14

7

3

1

8

9

2

4

6

5

13

12

App1

12

4

13

5

7

2

0

11

14

15

3

1

10

6

8

9

App2

5

12

13

1

15

7

9

14

6

0

11

4

3

8

10

2

App3

9

6

15

1

2

12

14

7

11

10

5

0

4

13

8

3

App4

0

6

7

4

13

10

12

5

15

8

14

9

3

2

1

11

App5

11

13

8

2

3

12

5

9

7

14

4

0

6

1

15

10

App6

7

12

10

15

11

14

6

4

13

3

2

9

8

1

5

0

App7

2

11

10

9

7

15

0

14

12

8

6

1

5

4

3

13

App8

1

13

3

5

15

4

11

0

8

7

9

10

6

12

14

2

App9

6

4

5

12

13

8

14

0

1

10

15

3

2

11

9

7

App10

5

11

13

8

0

9

1

15

14

4

2

3

12

10

7

6

App11

1

6

3

11

0

4

9

2

10

12

5

7

13

8

14

15

App12

13

12

3

4

10

6

7

8

5

1

14

15

9

0

2

11

App13

15

14

7

12

6

3

5

8

11

0

9

13

4

10

1

2

Table B.3: The results of Secure-BSL sorted passwords for the same applications that had 11 unused
interrupts when using tos-bsl software.
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